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COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT
Richard C. Brill, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1997
The aim of this thesis is to research the role of community in liberal thought.
The problem that has initiated this research is the erosion oftraditional communal
bonds in contemporary liberal society. This problem has been the focus of the debate
between communitarians and liberals for the past two decades. The research problem
will be to discover workable definitions of community and liberalism which have been
plagued with multiple interpretations throughout the debate.
The method of this thesis will be to first frame in the environment of the
original problem. The second chapter will address the precedents set by the debate
between liberals and communitarians. The third chapter will address the problem of
finding a workable definition of community that is relevant to the original problem, and
applicable to a liberal environment. Chapters N, V and VI will search for the concept
of community within three distinct periods ofliberal history. These chapters will
develop the principles ofliberal thought consistent when addressing the idea of
community.
Three major principles ofliberal thought emerge from this research; the priority
of the individual, the equality ofindividuals, and the goal ofindividual self-realization.
It will be discovered that liberal thought holds community to be necessary to a liberal
system; however, community is subordinate to the maximization ofliberal principles
and the general welfare of the larger community.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Somehow it would not seem contradictory to hold that citizens of modem
democratic societies adhere to the general principles of liberalism, while still endorsing
the idea of community. This would give the impression that these two ideas were
compatible. Yet throughout liberal history and with increasing intensity today, these
ideals have been placed in conflict, this later intensity heightened by the increasing
I

awareness of deterioration of community in modem liberal society. This conflict has
manifested itself in the debate of the liberal and communitarian for the last two decades
without resolution. At stake are two desirable conditions whose forces seem opposed
to many contemporary critics.
Communitarians hold that community is a social good which should elevate
obligations to its realization above the observance of certain individual rights. That
without this protection the hedonistic forces of individualism will eliminate community
2

to the detriment of the individual. Some communitarians claim in essence that they are
liberals criticizing the current interpretation of liberalism to better serve the individual.

3

That the collective authority of individuals better protects the individual from desires
bred from antisocial competition. Collective action allows the individual to do what
cannot be done alone, often to protect oneself from oneself. To answer the criticism
"why if community is desirable and natural is it that individuals have not voluntarily
maintained it?" the communitarian would answer that the present liberal promotion of
the individual right over collective authority has forced the individual to compete for
limited materialistic rewards without the temper of higher moral obligations.
1

2
The liberal response has been that there is an inherent and illiberal danger in
empowering a collective authority, that community is subordinate to the individual.
Collectivities are best created out of a voluntary foundation for the self interest of those
involved. Community is by the individual not for the individual, and should emerge
from them. The liberal sees an inherent danger of community becoming an
4

independent agent of coercion if empowered over the individual. Once more it is not
that the liberal finds community unattractive, but rather the individual right more
precious.
This stalemate of two desired notions presents the problem which becomes
central to the task of this thesis. It is not a shallow debate for the communitarian voice
has survived alongside the history of liberalism and has now literally consumed most
of the theoretical debate within liberal circles. Resolution to the problem of loss of
community seems to be mired in a metaphysical swamp where liberals and
communitarians have sought to build their foundations in order to defend their claims to
the role of community in relation to individual. The energy of the debate has been
focused on the communitarian claim that the individual is a social animal and thus
community should be prior to the individual.

5

The communitarian charges that

liberalism is in error in its assumption of the self prior to community and this has led to
an unnatural individualism where social alienation will result in the eventual destruction
6

of civil society. The liberal rebuttal has been focused on two counter criticisms of
communitarianism. The first is that communitarians have failed to prove man as a
social being, and while liberalism may have equal difficulty proving its metaphysical
claim of individual origin, it is better to error on the side of the individual whose
permanence of self consciousness is much stronger than community associations. The
second claim is that the solutions offered by the communitarian foundation are illiberal.

3
Not only have liberals gained success in countering the communitarian claims
as described above, but two other flaws have been revealed in the communitarian
criticism. The first is, of the four major communitarians MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor,
and Walzer, there seems to be no great consensus on the problem, solution, and nature
8

of community. Secondly, each tends to misrepresent liberalism in their criticisms.
Not only is there a mistaken interpretation of historical liberal thought as culminated in
the theories of John Rawls, but also there is the tendency to place liberalism to its
rightist extreme as a libertarian doctrine of asocial individualism or to its leftist extreme
as a centralized command system. Though the decades long debate has now exposed
the weaknesses of the communitarian, the time and vigor that liberals have contributed
to the debate suggest that the aspect of community in liberal thought may not have been
well articulated. Having successfully foiled the charges of communitarians, the liberal
must now search his/her own tradition for answers to the plight of community in postindustrial societies. What will be attempted in this thesis will be to arrive at a
justification of community within liberal thought, and to situate the role of community
more accurately in the liberal tradition. In order to proceed in this direction some
qualification of both the substantive and research problem must be accomplished.
The Problem
Erosion of Community
The main requirement prior to embarking on this research is to substantiate that
there is a problem present that needs attention. The substantive problem which
underlies this thesis is the sense of deterioration of community in modem liberal
systems. Certainly the vigor this debate has received reveals a sensitivity of both the
liberal and communitarian to an erosion of communal attachments in modem society

4

which may be detrimental to the individual. Though on the surface this problem may
seem to reflect a nostalgic pining of the inevitable evolution from the gemeinschaft to
gesellschaft, the debate has exposed deeper questions concerning the role of the
political system has played in this "natural" evolution.
At the heart of the problem lie two interrelated conditions of modem society: the
greater reliance upon the larger abstract community rather than the local community,
and the increased sense of asocial competitive individualism amoung individuals. They
are related in the sense that greater reliance on the abstract system for one's needs
fosters a false sense of self-sufficiency since one feels no direct obligation to
9

individuals in one's life. Communitarians tend to blame liberalism for the creation of
the centralized bureaucratic state which they see as smothering the importance of local
community, and for fostering competitive individualism at the expense of communal
attachments.

10

Some communtarians have suggested that the urgency of the debate has

been brought on by the realization that centralization and asocial individualism caused
by liberal policies is revealed by proof of more advanced deterioration to the more
intimate levels of neighborhood, extended family to greater breakdown of the nuclear
family.

II

However, the fears of greater centralization and asocial individualism do not
only concern communitarians, who have made these points central to the foundation of
their thought, but are concerns of liberals as well. Liberalism has always been critical
of movement to greater bureaucratic centralization with its implications toward
oligarchy.

12

It has also viewed asocial individualism as a threat to the necessary

collective obligations needed for the self realization of individuals.

13

It may be stated at

this level of the substantive problem, the deterioration of community, both liberal and
communitarian are joined. It is the cause and the solution to the problem that
disagreement is found. If communitarianism is disarmed of its validity to the cause and

5

solution of the problem in chapter one, then the task becomes the discovery of the
liberal answer to the substantive problem. What may be discovered is not that
liberalism is the cause of the problem, as communitarians claim, but rather that liberal
principles concerning community may have been ignored by modem liberal societies.
Defining Comm1.1nity

In the task of discovering the role of community in liberal thought, definitions
of both community and of liberalism must be arrived at. A plurality of concepts
describing both has often muddied the liberaVcommunitarian debate.

14

The problem in

defining community is that the term conveys multiple meanings. By not clearly
defining the parameters of community to be used, some theorists can flounder between
concepts and choose at will the concept which best defends the point at hand thus
adding to the vagueness of their results. Others, in assuming the reader shares their
conception of community, can be misinterpreted if the term community lacks
significant development. Therefore, in Chapter 2 a qualification of community will
take place so the reader is aware of the nature of community that will be scrutinized
within liberal thought.
There seems to be a dual nature in describing community. One description
focuses on its territorial aspect and ranges from national community to local
community. The other aspect is the interpersonal and deals with the interrelationships
of the members of that community, and ranges from simple iden6~:·with the group to
direct interdependencies. It is important to note that all territorial communities share
some type of interpersonal quality however, not all interpersonal communities need ~e
territorial. Examples of these exceptions would be associations and cultural groups.
The problem this duality presents is when the relationship between collective authority
and individual right are addressed. Certainly, a pure interpersonal community cannot

6
be grouped with a territorial community when assessing historic legal authority.
Therefore this thesis will focus on territorial community since it provides the legal
structure capable of implementing authority over citizens within a given area.
Within the range of territorial communities one may see a basic division of
national, regional, and local community. Each of these types of community can present
a different level of interpersonal relationship based on its physical qualities. Local
community differs significantly from the other two in the sense that the relationships
between members are direct rather than indirect. This has the potential to provide for a
greater sense of ownership of and control than the more larger abstract systems.
Though all can be capable of providing the basic needs of individuals, territorial
communities has been dynamic since recent history has provided an evolution from the
local to the national as the source of need fulfillment. The loss of the reliance on the
need systems oflocal community has altered the interpersonal aspect oflocal
community.

15

This shift described as the movement from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft

reflects an evolution from a more informal socio-economic system to a more formal
political-legal system. For it will be argued in Chapter II that oneness of community
was never one of social homogeneity, but rather oneness of mutual need and that the
glue was not political-moral law, but rather socio-economic interdependence. This
shift is the core of what has been considered the loss of community.

16

In Chapter II, sub-national communities will be the sites of community to be
dicussed. The term sub-national excludes referring to the the national society as a
whole to mean community. It is important to note here that the focus upon internal
communities should not be taken at the expense of the larger national society which is a
necessary reality of modem systems. It is only that this national "community'' does not
seem to be the center of the liberaVcommunitarian debate. Instead communitarians
have focused on a plurality of sub-national communities such as cultural and local

7
communities. Using these sub-national communities as the closest, not the only, site
of community authority argued in the liberaVcommunitarian debate will provide for a

/

more concrete definition of community in order to reference traditional liberal
principles. The research problem is that community has had little specific development
within liberal theory. Liberal theory was born in the awakening of the nation state and
the realization of national society. References to community and the relationship of the
individual to collective authority have tended to be articulated at that level. It is not that
community lacked importance, but that its stability allowed it to be taken for granted.
Relationships of collective authority to individual right were assumed to apply to all
collectives.

17

Therefore this thesis will extrapolate that liberal principles applied to the

larger community must also be applied to the smaller community as well.
Even though historic liberal thought tends to take a broad and abstract view of
community, specific attention will be paid to references of the role oflocal community
within liberal thought which helps to further develop the concept of subsidiarity within
liberalism. Local community is the definition of community most used by sociologists,
and lends itself most efficiently to classic conceptual requirements of community. It is
also the area where community has been considered most altered in modem times.
However, the term "local" itself can be misconstrued. It will be defined here as a
geographical area which is large enough to support the basic social needs of the group,
yet small enough for reasonable knowledge of and direct contact with all other
members within the area. Also important to this concept, in the same sense of what
makes a house a home, the members of the area, or community, must identify
themselves with that area. This implies that the area be recognizable through known
landmarks and enhanced by memory. Therefore, local community need not be
stereotyped as the rural village, but may also include in densely populated areas- a
borough, and in sparsely populated areas- a form of township.

8

Defining Liberalism
Not only have multiple definitions of community often blurred the
libera.Vcommunitarian debate, but also divergent definitions of liberalism have done so
as well. In order to arrive at the role of community in liberal thought, a set of liberal
principles have to be established that have remained consistent and become definitive of
liberalism. By taking a historic development of liberal thought a twofold purpose is
accomplished. First it will reveal the core principles which have remained static and
prove to be the litmus test of liberal belief. Second it reveals the dynamic nature of
liberalism as application of these core principles adjust to a changing environment.
It will be discovered in Chapters III through VI that three basic principles
remain consistent within liberal thought. These three concepts are: (1) the primacy of
the individual, (2) the equality of individuals, and (3) the self-realization of the
individual. "Rights" are not a core concept, but rather a dynamic expression of the core
concepts when they are placed in the reality of social existence and changing
environment. It is this latter expression ofliberalism which gives it a sense of
perpetual motion, since the environment in which it is set in is variable, it is always
adapting to a new set of circumstances. Therefore to define it at this level is much like
interpreting common law. To gain an understanding one must review its evolution
compiling precedents into a comprehensible body of thought. This is the process
which will be accomplished here in search of precedents which may be able to situate
the role oflocal community within a liberal society. For this purpose liberalism will be
divided into three distinctive evolutionary periods: early industrial, late industrial, and
post-industrial.

9
Early Industrial Liberalism
An introduction to the early industrial period will mention the pre-industrial
period which covered the 17th and 18th centuries. Thomas Hobbes will become the
natural starting point. Even though he is not often spoken in the same breath as rights,
his idea of the social contract broke traditional thought and laid the justification for the
creation of rights by John Locke.

18

Locke's influence would dominate this period.

His rational empiricism was the appropriate answer for a society left in a vacuum
caused by the decreasing authority of the church and throne. Locke's notoriety as the
father of liberalism will no doubt signal the influence he has had in contemporary
definitions of liberalism. This period will also provide a constructive critic of liberal
political philosophy in the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. More democratic,
emotional, and more collective than Locke, Rousseau's influence on the more
individualistic and pragmatic anglo-american liberal thought has not been as dominant.
However, Rousseau's ideas have provided a continual fountainhead which has kept the
internal liberal debate alive. Most important to this thesis is the fact that Rousseau
specifically elevates local community and his works have since provided a source of
legitimacy for communitarians today.

19

Two other critics of Lockean based liberalism

are also worthy of mention in this period Edmund Burke and David Hume. Burke's
contribution of Natural Law as opposed to Locke's law of nature stresses in a sense,
like Rousseau, a more organic rather than a mechanical view of society. However,
where Locke's moral discovery is empirical Burke's becomes historical.

20

Hume's

role in this period will be very similar to Hobbes as a breakaway and foundational
philosophical force. Both men, highly criticized in their own time, would end up
changing that time Hobbes ushering in the Lockean period of pre-industrial liberalism
and Hume signaling its end with his skepticism. Hume's ideas will end up being the

10

foundation of Benthamite utilitarians which will dominate the next liberal period.

21

It

will also be useful to develop the contributions of Immanuel Kant in this transition
period. Like Locke, Kant was a synthesizer of opposing ideas. His view on duality of
self tried to bridge the differences between the transcendental knowledge of morality
and the empirical knowledge of the material world in an effort to save morality from the
22

void left with skepticism. In doing so he will provide a foundation for the individual
by removing the individual from a purely organic existence. However, his ethical
"categorical imperative" will later add equality to the liberal quotient. This period was
the foundational basis for future interpretations of liberalism. Dominated by Locke's
defense of rights, this period soon gave way to a period of individualism - early
industrial liberalism.
A second major shift in dominant liberal interpretation was found in the
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. Using the logic of Hume's skepticism, Bentham
developed his pleasure principle which became a more palatable application of
skepticism to the increasingly scientific liberal society. It was to be the dominant liberal
interpretation of this period. Though one of Bentham's main objectives was an
equality (opportunity) based liperalism aimed at the landed gentry, the direction of his
philosophy was to be driven by the new middle class capitalists.

23

Like Locke's,

Bentham's ideas were ripe for th~ir time. Integrated with the ideas of the economists
Smith and Ricardo, Bentham's liberalism was to take on a self-interest individualism
which was to be later criticized as hedonistic if not inhumane.

24

Leading the opposition

within this liberal debate was a movement called Romanticism. Taking their torch from
Rousseau were the chief critics of liberal utilitarianism, Samuel Coleridge and Thomas
Carlyle. They emphasized the organic nature of the world, thus stressing more faith in
the collective rather than in the individual. To the Romantics collective did not mean

11
government, but rather it meant "individuals" as a social group. However, these
disciples of Rousseau's ideas, due to their industrial environment, stressed Nature as
their new sacred. They also were influenced by the individuality of their time. A
glorification of the individual hero as a standard bearer for the greater collective became
a common theme. The Romantic movement was considered conservative in the sense
that they were less optimistic about industrialization, hence their admiration for Nature.
However, European conservatives, unlike their American counterpart, were
sympathetic to the working-class poor, whereas the liberal utilitarian movement found
its base in the middle-class capitalists.

25

Though the romantics remained the stepchild

of the liberal movement, their influence was to be felt by the end of this period. John
Stuart Mill, heavily steeped in the utilitarian doctrine, was to emerge by the end of this
time as the dominant liberal. He did this by softening utilitarianism of its harsher
implications through an almost Lockean moral rationalization of standards of behavior.
Though Mill remained a true disciple of individualism, romantic influences led him to
imply that there was something to life beyond pure mathematical utility.

26

He was to be

the stepping stone to the new liberalism of the later industrial period. However, the
weakening Romantic movement was to be transformed as well. G.W.F. Hegel was,
by the sheer volume of his works, to steal the thunder of the Rousseauean Romantic
tradition. His scientific explanation of the monistic and organic nature of society would
make him the icon of the time-honored collective approach.

27

From Hegel would

branch two main schools of thought; the social democrat and the socialist which will
debut in the later industrial period.
Late Industrial Liberalism
The flashpoint signaling that a new liberal period had evolved was found in the
lectures of Thomas Hill Green. His words reflected what most concerned most citizens
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of liberal society in the wake of the industrial period, that the highly individualistic
liberalism had created its own moral dilemma. The free market authorized by
utilitarianism had created a new barbarian in mankind. The dilemma was that science
had rendered the old moral authority bankrupt, yet this new science had nothing to
replace it with. Green offered philosophy as the new moral authority.

28

His aim was

to incorporate two rival traditions into one; a Hegelian Liberal. His idealism based on
an organic and monistic view of society was tempered with Kant's ethics based in the
categorical imperative i.e., the moral equality of humanity. Criticizing J.S. Mill for not
going far enough, Green envisioned a highly democratic collective pursuing a common
good limited only by historically held understandings which protected the natural
equality of individuals.

29

What was to be the dynamic precedent set by Green was the

view of government in an active (positive) role to foster social liberty. This was to be
the defining element of the later industrial period. Green's idealism, more based in the
moral than economic, was not strong enough itself to survive on its own. The increase
of economic inequality and the shock of World War I brought about a realism which all
but extinguished the flicker of hope in idealism. Leonard Hobhouse and John Hobson
extracted the sense of Kantian equality and positive government from Green but
downplayed the Hegelian influences which were at the time blamed for the nationalism
which consumed the world in war.

30

Their brand of humanism based on dignity as a

right of mankind viewed government not as tyrant but protector and ushered in the
welfare state liberal to the twentieth century. Herbert Spencer became the defender of
the now traditional individualist movement. Though Spencer's use of Darwin's theory
of natural selection was to stress the moral nature of individualism in the larger society,
it did this by using a more Hegelian organic basis.

31

At this same time , the Pluralists,

most notably Earnst Barker and Harold Laski , were stressing the need of associations
and their protection within the modern liberal state.

32

They feared that individuals
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would remain powerless in mass society unless there were associations present to
empower them This new renunciation of collective right also forewarned a new
dilemma of the liberal state; pluralism. Perhaps the stepping off point into the postindustrial state lies with John Dewey. Dewey, an American, appropriately infuses
liberalism at this time with a long held American cultured pragmatism. Dewey's socialliberalism continued the new liberal platform and incorporated the ideas of education
and progression as necessary promotions of a liberal system. For Dewey, history
represented an educational tool, not a moral dictate. His pragmatism focused on the
clear assessment of the status quo and a process of continual adjustment to maintain
maximum social liberty. Both assessment and adjustment requiring dissemination of
knowledge, in order that a monopoly of information or spread of misinformation is not
used for individual benefit over others. Dewey's pragmatism of liberalism would
become an important ingredient in the post- industrial period.

33

Post-Industrial Liberalism
Building upon a more pragmatic assessment of moral restraints and
acknowledging the problems of plurality first defined by the pluralists and later in this
period elaborated by Robert Dahl, John Rawls' liberalism became the measuring stick
of the post-industrial period. His uneasiness with the lack of morality of utilitarianism,
yet his fear of the subjective morality of intuitionism caused him to develop a postKantian liberal faith based on equal liberty. His moral foundation was drawn not from
a belief in the existence of a social contract but rather the need to form a hypothetical
one. His view of Liberalism based on a procedural "justice" as opposed to the
traditional rights, utility, or equality. Still stressing a primacy of rights, Rawls
envisioned an original position which could produce the moral legitimacy for his
difference principle, a principle aimed at providing justice within a pluralistic society.

14
Rawls used justice as the maximum arrangements of rights and equality in a liberal
society. As Rawls established a new and dominant liberal ground within liberal
thought, two other voices proceeded to uphold renovated versions of the historical
liberal debate. To the one side of Rawls is the libertarian voice of Robert Nozick.
Nozick's liberalism claimed heritage to Lockean and utilitarian tradition. Nozick's
direction was to pull liberalism away from its path of positive government, and restate
the qualities of individualism and property entitlement.

34

On the other side of Rawls

were the Communitarians. The communitarian movement found its strength in the
tradition of Rousseau. Its direction was not only to restate the collectivist position of
the common good and its requirement of obligation, but also to justify this by
reintroducing local community and the morality of sentiment.

35

The authors of this

communitarian position are found in Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer,
and Alistair MacIntyre. Though different in their justifications and vision of
communitarianism, there is a common thread which binds them to a movement they
themselves have not admitted membership to.

36

Method
By qualifying the use of community to imply sub-national communities, and
stressing both the static nature and dynamic expression of liberal thought within this
introduction, the research of this thesis will be to search for the justification of
community within liberal thought. To accomplish this, chapter two will focus on the
communitarian criticism and the liberal rebuttal which serves as the stepping off point
for the research at hand. The communitarian criticism reflects a sensitivity to an issue
of community which, due to the vigor the liberal has afforded it, reflects a challenge of
modem liberal societies. The liberal rebuttal, however, serves to disarm the

15
communitarian solution and leave open the question on how liberalism views
community.
Chapter III will define and defend the use of sub-national communities as an
entities to be researched in liberal thought. It will address these questions concerning
community; what is its structure?, why might it be desirable and beneficial to the
individual of a liberal society?, and what would be its relationship to the realities of the
larger state?. These questions will help frame the notion of community to be found in
liberalism that is considered in peril within modem liberal societies.

In Chapters N, V and VI the defined notion of community will be applied to
the four periods of liberalism defined previously. This will be done in search of
justification of local community through the various interpretations of liberalism. Three
questions will be asked of each period. The first question will inquire about the role of
local community as a structure in liberal thought. The second question will inquire
about the limits of collective authority within liberal thought. The third, and highly
complex question, will inquire about the neutrality of "progress" (for lack of a better
word), and the role of the collective authority in relation to it. For if progress,
technological advancement, plays a role in the deterioration of community in modem
liberal states, then does a community have the authority to protect itself against the
effects of progress. The assessment of this research will then be summarized in the
final chapter.
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CHAPfERII
THE LIBERAVCOMMUNITARIAN DEBATE
The liberal communitarian debate serves as a good point to start since it has
provided the momentum which brings the task of this thesis at hand. This chapter will
first begin with the general communitarian charge which has been significant enough to
draw the attention of liberals over the past two decades. While liberals do not deny the
decline ofcivic identity in contemporary liberal states, they due balk at the
communitarian claim that liberalism is at fault. This charge is important in that it not
only brought the idea ofcommunity to the table, but that it also has forced many liberal
theorists to define more clearly liberalism apart from its collective left and
individualistic right. The second part of the chapter will focus on the liberal criticism ·of
communitarianism. This will serve the purpose ofdisarming the communitarian
criticism ofliberalism as the problem and communitarian principles as the answer to the
erosion of community. This will set the stage for developing the liberal position on
community which could address the original problem ofcommunity.
On the surface the communitarian charge appears to be aimed at two distinct
forces; these are the greater reliance on the larger national collective authority whose
dictates seem to require a greater uniformity among citizens, and a sense ofgreater
asocial individualism where self-satisfaction tends to override self-interest. The brunt
ofthe communitarian charge is that liberalism has fostered this progression at the
expense ofthe individual whom liberals claim to protect. The communitanans leveling
this charge have been Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Alisdair MacIntyre and Michael
Walzer. However, it must be noted here that the reference to "communitarian" does not
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carry the same weight as the tenn "liberal". First, as will be elaborated on shortly, all
four main communitarian theorists lack consensus on their approach to the problem and
solution of community. In fact, the label "communitarian" was simply used to rope in
their general direction of criticism, not one consciously adopted by any one of the
l

theorists. Secondly, communitarian thought has been largely a criticism not a
construction of a comprehensive political theory. Certainly it has lacked the historical
and philosophical development of liberal thought. A more accurate portrayal of
communitarianism would be to treat it as part of a dialectical force, drawing attention to
a perceived weakness of the dominant liberal expression of the time. In this way, it has
played a similar role to the influences of Rousseau and the Romantic movement upon
the liberal doctrine of an earlier time. While both of these movements articulated a
concern for the individual, their fragmented and illiberal implications only allowed them
to be corrective forces instead of replacement philosophies. It is based on this
assessment that one cannot simply treat the liberaVcommunitarian debate as choosing
one position over the other, for as this thesis argues, one can fruitfully look toward
liberalism as the soil which will produce community. However, the communitarian
criticism is not unwarranted, since critical movements usually expose inherent flaws in
certain specific contemporary interpretations which ultimately affect future
interpretations. So the purpose of this chapter will be to both expose the merits of the
communitarian claim which is the sensitivity to the problems of community which
initiates the research of this thesis, and to expose the shallowness of the communitarian
alternative, both conclusions establishing the importance of positve reexamination of
liberalism and community.
As stated earlier, the most evident contribution of the communitarian was to
advance the idea of community as the focus of extensive debate. It could also be
assumed by the impact the debate has had, that both liberals and communitarians had
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perceived a quickening of the erosion process of traditional community relationships in
modern liberal societies. It could be said that the communitarian movement forced
liberals to address the idea of community. The spark of the movement may be traced to
Amitai Etzioni, a sociologist who has been given credit for the term "communitarian".

It was his warning from research on the impact ofloss of community that added a
2

credibility for political debate on the subject. Strengthening his research was the
greater awareness of the socio-psychological impact on the identity of self held by
modem science. This not only forced liberals to reassess community and its
importance, but it also forced liberals to reassess the individual who now appears more
determined by environment and less autonomous. Therefore, the contribution of the
communitarian was to reawaken the liberal to the interpretation of self and community.
Since community authority is dependent on the definition of self, the debate was largely
3

consumed by disagreements over the metaphysical conception of self. Herein lies the
greatest weakness of the communitarian, who as the challenger of the doctrinal status
quo has the burden of proof at this metaphysical level in order to further pursue the
sources of community authority.
At this metaphysical level, there is some agreement amoung Sandel, MacIntyre,
and Taylor which has bound them together as communitarians. Walzer tends to engage
the debate more on the question of universality of morality, and will be treated
separately. Of the three commuilitarians previously mentioned agreement seems to
center on the issues of the conception of self, the error of asocial individualism,
4

subjectivism, and the issues of antiperfectionism verses neutrality. However, as will
be developed here, even this very broad agreement on principles lacks consensus on
the significant details of interpretation. It should further be noted that their attack on
liberalism when applying these principles may not reflect an accurate interpretation of
liberalism.
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Though the recipient of the communitarian criticism may be liberalism in
general, some communitarians, most notably Sandel, have focused on the leading
contemporary interpretation of liberalism as found in John Rawls.

A more extensive

interpretation of Rawls will be found in chapter six, but for now a brief understanding
of Rawls is helpful in order to understand the communitarian charge. Very briefly,
Rawls holds "justice" as the highest good of liberal thought. In a pragmatic stance, he
realizes that the contemporary environment is heir to many inequalities which lead to
the unequal self-realization of individuals. However, holding true to liberal principles,
traditional corrective measures to redistribute opportunities are in themselves illiberal.
Faced with this dilemma, Rawls seeks to offer and justify a working principle that will
bring liberalism back to maximum equality ofliberty specific to an environment,
without forsaking the time honored principles of liberalism. He has established the
"difference principle" to accomplish this. This states that when a collective makes a
decision it should be based on the principle that inequalities of distribution are to occur
only when it benefit the least advantaged group within a society. With this principle,
Rawls hopes for an eventual evolution of society toward a just distribution of goods
that is also efficient. This efficiency arises from Rawls's rule that there will be
inequalities of distribution, but only those inequalities which enhance the equal
maximum self-realization of all are justifiable and that maxim izing self-realization yields
greater efficiency. In order to justify the difference principle, Rawls relies on his
conception of the "original position".
The original position serves as the moral framework for the difference
principle. Here Rawls states that since there is no ascertainable evidence of the
metaphysical properties of the individual, then a logical and hypothetical framework
can be assumed to give foundation to liberal principles. In the original position
individuals are situated behind a "veil of ignorance". Due to the fact that individuals

inherit natural talents and social positions, self-interest would bias any deliberative
arrival of principles since those inherent features would create inequality of voice in
formation of those principles. Therefore, Rawls asks individuals to put themselves in a
hypothetical situation of not knowing one's natural and social inheritance, and asks
them to create principles of distribution logically based on one's self-interest in this
altered state. Rawls believes the difference principle would be the logical choice of the
individualdenied accurate knowledge of one's actual social status. It is the idea of the
6
original position that Sandel attacks when developing the conception of self.
The Communitarian Claim
The conception of the person is the initial point of debate that communitarians
engage liberals. This concept seeks to explain how the idea of "self' is manifested. It
is the major foundational basis of the debate since its focus is to determine which is
prior the individual or the community. The communitarian claim is that identity and
behavior of the self is primarily created by the society one inhabits. This is similar to
Cooley's looking-glass theory, where who we are is determined on how we perceive
ourselves through others. This leads the communitarian to hold that society, not the
individual, creates the self. Therefore, the communitarian will claim, if the individual
is largely determined by society, should not more importance be placed on the "proper''
cultivation of the individual by community rather than the false free will veto of the
deviant individual? Communitarians will not only state that it is impossible to imagine
human origin as void of social interaction for any purpose, but that it is through social
interaction which makes human beings "human" instead of simply actors with animal
desires.

However, it is important to note here that there is some degree of distortion

as communitarians paint the picture of the liberal as de-void of any knowledge of social
interaction in the claim of the individual as prior. This view of liberalism is positioned
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to the far right of contemporary interpretations of liberalism, and has some illiberal
implications within it.
Sandel, more than the other two communitarians, directs the force of his
9

argument mainly upon Rawls instead of liberalism in general. He claims not so much
that Rawls's liberalism is undesirable, but rather that its metaphysical foundation is
flawed.

10

He views Rawls's original position as being in error by placing individuals

behind the veil of ignorance isolated from their social essences. Sandel claims that
individuals behind the veil of ignorance would not be "similarly'' situated but rather
"identically'' situated. He claims that there would be no bargaining in the original
position because differences would not exist, that there would be no voluntary
agreement but only cognitive knowing. He also argues that this veil would not even
allow individuals any knowledge of the possible natural and social outcomes on which
to base their decisions. Therefore, Sandel believes the original metaphysical state to be
communal existence since no contract could be established without knowledge or
voluntary consent.

11

He believes Rawls was forced to conceive of prior self existence

in order to justify the difference principle from criticism from the liberal right,
specifically Robert Nozick.

12

Sandel believes that in order to prove the lack of desert

concerning natural and social acquisition, Rawls had to develop a Kantian
intersubjectivity in the original state.

13

Sandel argues that self is constituted by the

social and political community one inhabits, and that society is prior to the individual
identity of self. He argues that the individual is encumbered by a thick embeddedness
of social influences that one cannot extract. He does believe that it may be possible for
an individual to engage in a process of self assessment in order to gain knowledge of
one's own personal encumbrances however, it becomes impossible to view any self
beyond that threshold. This would allow individuals to step back in a limited sense,
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and allows Sandel to differ from other comm unitarians by stating that self identity can
be partially created by the individual.

14

MacIntyre takes a more pessimistic and hostile view of liberal tradition than the
other two communitarians.

15

He sees little hope for communal goods at the nation state

level as they are presently constituted, yet sees liberalism as the only reasonable option
when addressing the plurality of the national society.

16

He faults liberalism in general

for its conception of the individual as prior to community. He states that individual
identity is gained through social phenomena such as practices and traditions, and that
individuals cannot escape the moral wiring of communal attachments. His view of
self-identity is often labeled as Neo-Aristotlelian because it places weight upon identity
through traditions.

17

He sees the construction of identity through historic evolution of

social roles and their expectations. MacIntyre claims that the key to identity is to stand
within roles not outside them, for the human being does not exist outside of them.

18

Taylor, like MacIntyre, is more critical of liberalism as a whole than of Rawls
specifically in fact, Taylor barely refers to Rawls in his work. Where MacIntyre is
19

hostile towards liberalism and Sandel tries to limit it, Taylor seeks to correct it. His
view of a conception of self is based in the idea of the linguistic community. He
believes humans are self-interpreting beings in whom their community structure
supplies the language to give identity to the individual.

20

Taylor sees the distortion of

self-realization through liberal principles that foster the myth of the unencumbered self.
He sees this as the cause of a modem identity crisis.

21

Taylor states that the liberal

notion of the individual is an empty one because institutions and language give meaning
to self, not some intersubjective voice which claims some a priori knowledge. He
believes that individuals need "authoritative horizons" to give meaning to will. To be
free without reference of direction is mere action for the sake of action.

22
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The second claim of the communitarians deals with the concept of asocial
individualism. The charge here is that liberalism is in error by assuming individuals to
be by nature asocial, and that they choose only voluntarily to associate, which
communitarians claim is the basis of the social contract theory. Communitarians have
claimed that individuals have always been a part of communal entities, and that it would
be impossible to imagine a prior existence of solitary individuals. Sandel differs from
MacIntyre and Taylor in that he believes that the liberal view of conception of self has
fostered the idea of the asocial self, whereas MacIntyre and Taylor see the opposite
relationship that the promoted asocial behavior of the individual forced the development
of the theory that the self is prior. Sandel criticizes Rawls for assuming that it is useful
to postulate a hypothetical contractual event. He claims that this has fostered the
priority of individual freedom over social equality, therefore stunting the idea of
f ratemity in liberal thought.

23

MacIntyre claims that Rawls's original position is actually a social contract in
which individuals voluntarily decide to join without any priority toward community
goods. Like Sandel, MacIntyre holds that an individual's identity is known only
through the social matrix, and that it would be impossible to gain a conception of the
individual without it. He claims that the liberal development of the social contract
theory, based on the conception of the asocial individual, doomed community to
erosion by competitive egoistic whims which were placed at a higher order than
community. He charges that it was enlightenment liberalism whose asocial principles
have since waged assault on the concept of traditions so crucial to communal
attachments, and whose authority upheld social virtues.

24

He claims that liberal

policies have allowed virtue to exist, but did so by roping it off to voluntaristic private
sectors. MacIntyre believes that the asocial conception of self has led to the notion that
cooperation with others is an option and has created a decrease in civility.

26
Taylor once again uses the idea oflanguage to support his criticism of the
asocial individual. He believes that here could not exist an individual prior to the
contract due to the fact that the individual would lack expression if the linguistic
community was not formed. He is much more sympathetic to the idea of political
asocialism which is learned than of philosophical asocialism which is inherent. To be
truly asocial he believes one must be totally autonomous and self-sufficient, and this
has not been the historical precedent.

25

Communitarians also charge liberalism with subjectivity. Subjectivity is the
idea that individuals determine their own conception of good independent of society.
The communitarian criticism is that liberals see individuals as arbitrarily choosing their
own preference of the good. This is not to say that individuals do not have the power
of choice; rather, communitarians claim that the individual's choice has been affected
by socializ.ation. This relates to the idea that the individual preferences are not prewired
but are cultivated by society. Sandel claims that this has created the priority of the right
over the good in liberal thought. He states that Rawls allows choices of the individual
to be mere personal preferences with no commitment toward communal good, and that
the self freely choosing ends are ends not formed by communal attachments but by
some abstract self.

26

Sandel claims that due to the fact that individual identity is

socially "thick" rather than "thin", the good is heavily objective (formed by
community), and therefore the good is teleological rather than arbitrary. He states that
the good must be prior to the right, for if the right was prior what motive would guide
it.

27

For Sandel, the self is constituted by its ends but its boundaries are fluid we

discover our identity and our good through shared meanings.

28

MacIntyre blames liberal subjectivity for the existence of the emotive self who
seeks self- interest through manipulation of others. He sees liberalism as a subjective
doctrine doomed to unresolvable conflict of personal pluralistic preferences. He states
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that subjectivism has allowed a situation where there is a lack of an authority, an
overarching framework, needed for conflict resolution. MacIntyre requires nested
social matrices to promote deliberation about morality, and the discovery within the
small local community of an objective good.

29

Taylor, however, argues for

"landmarks of good" in order to judge ourselves. He states that objective morality is
needed to create identity for the individual. It not only gives meaning to "where are we
going", but also to "who we are". Taylor develops the idea of the "hypergood" in
which reasoning and experience replace old hypergoods. He claims we are constantly
ranking conflicting goods in search of an improved hypergood.

30

Taylor believes that

the subjective being is simply a creation of liberal thought, and fears that if subjectivism
is dominant only Nietzshean nihilism would exist, causing freedom to be reduced to
power.

31

Taylor feels the good life should be debated amoung intellectuals which

would preserve such traditional found goods not to be in error. He states that civil
society would be the corrective maintenance of the objective good instead of liberal
32
reliance on the cultural marketplace.
The last of the concepts which tie the communitarian front together is the
concept of anti-perfectionism and neutrality. The idea addressed under this compound
heading concerns itself with the role of the state to remain neutral in both the
identification of and intervention for the social good. Comm unitarians claim that it the
neutral stance that liberals have taken on these two points which has helped break the
cohesion of communal attachments. Sandel specifically accuses Rawls of remaining
neutral and exclusionary in choices of competing social goods. Rawls has made the
distinction between comprehensive, political, and private areas of social-political
action. In the comprehensive area Rawls has stated that the state should remain neutral.
In the political area he has allowed the state to intervene for only thin goods and
maintenance of a rational consensus of a well-ordered state. In the private area the
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individual should be able to operate without interference of the state.

33

Sandel argues

that Rawls can not remain neutral at the comprehensive level. He states that the idea of
mutual respect within Rawlsian liberalism actually needs an authority to carry it out.
He believes that Rawls fails to appreciate the thick nature of common good in liberal
thought at the comprehensive level, and if the comprehensive level becomes
perfectionist then the political level becomes tainted by it. The charge by Sandel is that
Kantian equality at the comprehensive level and the exclusionary principle at the private
level keeps Rawls from his own neutrality claim.

34

MacIntyre and Taylor join Sandel on the common criticism that liberalism is not
neutral as a philosophy. MacIntyre claims that the anti-traditions principle of early
liberalism has been swapped for the anti-communal principle of modem liberalism, and
that this shift reveals a conscious changing of goods within liberalism. Like Sandel, he
states that separation of public and private goods and the stance on individual priority
all reflect a break with neutrality.

35

MacIntyre conceives the authority of the small

community as the only hope to pursue traditional virtue and provide for the adequate
authority horizon in which to pursue shared ends.

36

The fear is that if the liberal nation

state is perfectionist, it would be impossible to maintain a non-coercive moral
consensus given modem pluralism. Taylor also feels the liberal tradition is based in
thick identity of the good because it must account for "why'' when acting on a political
level.

37

He feels that the assumed neutrality of liberalism has fostered a growing

danger oflack of authority, neutralizing the authority society requires to check the
negative forces of self-interest.

38

Like MacIntyre, he envisions the local community as

the only structure which could bracket the good effectively.
Though diverse in their justifications, these four concepts provide the rallying
point of the communitarian front. Communitarians see the individual as organically
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tied to community prior to the realization of self and the creation of the political
community. They fault liberalism for creating an unrecognizable solitary self-equipped
individual with transcendental knowledge of self and a specific good genuine to that
self. They all believe moral authority needs to be strengthened, and that this is only
possible within sub-national communities where a shared tradition and environment can
articulate a clearer consensus of the good with less coercion than the larger pluralistic
community can. They fault liberalism's claim to be neutral, by claiming that its failure
to promote a good is a promoting a secular amorality. There are also two other claims
which may be joined here. As was refered to earlier, Michael Walzer also attacks
liberalism on another front not as heavily tred as the other communitaians which is the
idea of universality. Here Walzer charges that liberalism claims universality which
means that liberal principles are applicable through time and place. He holds that this
makes liberalism appear to claim a truth which would certainly place it as being a nonneutral doctrine.
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However, if liberalism would deny its universal claims then it must

allow communities who differ on views of the good the autonomy to follow their own
perception of the good. Finally, the solution all of these communitarians seem to offer,
though there is no great consensus on specifics, is that community which is within the
national system and identifiable by shared meaning, traditions, and interest should have
the moral authority to protect itself from forces that break its cohesion from the inside
or outside.
The Liberal Rebuttal
The liberal rebuttal has concentrated on addressing the four charges of the
communitarians with a counterclaim that not only are some of the communitarian claims
illiberal, but that some claims distort the liberal tradition to the advantage of the
communitarian. On the first idea of the conception of the self, comm unitarians have
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tended to put more weight on the liberal idea of the metaphysical state than liberals have
been willing to grant. Liberalism as a tradition has tried to avoid metaphysical claims
because of their intuitive and normative implications. Liberalism since Locke has
claimed a basis in the empirical, and as a philosophy has allowed individuals the choice
of metaphysical conceptions rather than the philosophy itself choosing a particular one.
Instead of the descriptive conception of an unrecognizable ghostly and solitary self, as
communitarians have often portrayed the liberal conception of self, the liberal response
has been that since society cannot comprehend the metaphysical then let the benefit of
the doubt lie with the individual whose self-consciousness remains the strongest
experience of truth when approaching the metaphysical. In essence liberals do not
claim a metaphysical self, but rather base the priority of the individual on present
experience. This is to say that the individual priority is based empirically on what is
known rather than assumption on what is not known. Contrary to communitarian
claims, liberals do not reject the strong claims that individual identity is more socially
wired then had been previously understood. However, the liberal rebuttal is that within
the encumbered individual is still the decision making process of a conscious individual
whose consciousness is a real and powerful experience compared to the abstract
concept of community consciousness.

40

The Rawlsian interpretation of self has also been misrepresented by
'

communitarian critics. Rawls had intended to use the idea of the self in the original
position as a hypothetical tool to form a logical principle of justice within modem
liberal society, not as a metaphysical assumption of individual origin. The
unencumbered self in the original position was meant to extract, by use of disinterested
selves, the principles of equality and self-realization within liberal thought which could
not be arrived at by real selves tainted by inequalities. Rawls's motive is not to
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convince individuals of the existence of the self behind the veil of ignorance, but to
invoke empathy in order to provide understanding to liberal principles.

41

The idea of the asocial individual is also within the metaphysical area in to
which contemporary liberals do not wish to tread. The communitarian criticism here is
that liberals perceive a social contract in which the solitary and unencumbered
individual, perceived in the last concept, voluntarily decides to engage. The main idea
here is that the individual at one point decides to become social. The liberal rebuttal
here is that communitarians have narrowed liberal thought to a Lockean interpretation
of the social contract which has long been abandoned by mainstream liberalism.

42

Current interpretations of the Lockean contract are still held by elements of the right of
liberal thought, such as Robert Nozick and the libertarian movement, but these
interpretations have illiberal implications that most liberals reject. Though liberals tend
not to speculate at the metaphysical level, the idea of a communal origin is not
necessarily incompatible with liberalism. However, this does not negate the
individual's priority within liberalism since an assumption of social wiring does not
remove the reality of self-consciousness of an individual within a social setting. In
fact, the liberal conception of the social contract, historical or hypothetical, stresses the
reality and importance of communal cooperation not a fostering of asocial
individualism.

43

On the third concept of subjectivity communitarians claim that liberals perceive
the individual as capable of formation and pursuit of a subjective good, rather than the
objective view that there is one conception of the good and the individual gains
knowledge of this through social learning. The liberal rebuttal here has been to accept
the communitarian charge but to defend it by further qualification. The communitarian
claim of liberal subjectivism led one to assume that liberals hold no conception of a
good besides an individual's choice of their own personal preferences. This statement
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gives the impression of amoralism where any action is good if the individual believes it
to be. The liberal responds to this misperception at two levels. The first is that there
are three spheres in which the good may be applied, the interaction of the individual
with the state, the interaction of the individual with other individuals, and the
individual's private actions. In the last category liberals have held a strong subjective
stance in that individuals in their private beliefs should be free to formulate and pursue
their own conception of the good. However, in the two public spheres liberals allow
minimal use of an objective good to avoid a conflict of goods which would render a
well-ordered state impossible.

44

The second level of interpretation qualifies the

subjective and minimal objective reasoning. Liberals hold dominantly to the subjective
interpretation when possible due to the fact that there are differing conceptions of the
good. To choose one without consensus would create an illiberal situation where a
normative good of some could be forced on others. This is not to say that liberals do
not entertain the idea that some goods have been proven to be better than others, that a
present perception of an objective good may seem to exist. However, liberalism has
opted that government maintain the environment for the individual to realize the good
rather than to force the good upon the individual. Since the liberal denies the
possibility of knowledge of total truth, it is better to allow perceptions of the good to be
subject to the scrutiny of the dynamic marketplace of ideas, rather than locked in the
self-ordained authority of traditions.

45

The last claim of the communitarian is the claim of anti-perfectionism and
neutrality which states that liberalism refuses belief in the existence of an objective
good so therefore does not allow the state to promote any conception of good. On the
first claim of anti-perfectionism this charge is not sufficient since there have been
claims of perfectionsim in the liberal ideas of Thomas Hill Green and most recently
Joseph Raz. However, their perfectionism is limited in the sense that it tends to
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function as operational ideals. The idea here is that there may be an existence of a pure
good but total knowledge of it is impossible therefore, the state should not interpret it
but only foster its discovery.

46

The dominant liberal interpretation, however, refuses to

entertain metaphysical questions of an objective good though this does not mean that it
must remain totally neutral. Most liberals will claim that there has never been a totally
neutral state, that in order to serve its dominant purpose of maintaining order through
the distribution of limited resources it is forced to concede to a limited conception of
what is good.

47

However, this is not a reflection of an objective good but rather a

reflection of what current opinion holds to be the proper rules, gained through
experience, to provide for the maximization of self-realization. It is here that liberals
will deny that they allow government to remain neutral, but that they do so in order to
provide the means to the individual not the ends.

48

The purpose of this chapter, as was stated earlier, is twofold. Its first purpose
was to introduce the communitarian criticism which has recently forced the liberal to
engage the subject of community. Here, the communitarian has brought to the table the
concepts of erosion of community and the greater awareness of the social impact on
self that had lacked greater development within liberal thought. The weight of these
queries have stirred debate within liberal thought enough that some have said motivated
John Rawls to alter his position, and has supplied the problem this thesis will entertain.
The second purpose was to expose the weaknesses of the communitarian criticism of
liberalism. It has been developed that all the communitarians, with possible exception
of MacIntyre, have made their main goal to change liberal interpretations, not to replace
liberalism with a new philosophy. The development of their criticisms and solutions
have also revealed that communitarianism may not only be historically shallow, but
also lacks adequate consensus to provide a well-defined solution to the problem they
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initiate. Finally their criticisms of liberalism as the fault of the problem has been
disarmed by the fact, as has been developed above, that they have not only have
misinterpreted liberal positions, but they have also offered illiberal propositions in its
place. This neutralizing of the communitarian criticism is important to this thesis in that
it frames liberalism as the environment for discovery of communal principles which
may address the original problem.
Since the liberaVcommunitarian has introduced the problem (the fate of
community) and its resolution has provided the environment (liberalism), the task at
hand will be to research the role of community within liberal thought. In order to
proceed through liberal history in search of precedents which can be constructed into a
principle of community, it becomes necessary to place some reasonable limits on what
is meant by community. This will become the task of the next chapter which will limit
the concept of community by its relationship to the original problem addressed and to
recognizable socio-political structures in order to stay within the limitations of this
thesis.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY
Not only have communitarians lacked consensus on their criticisms of
liberalism as the reason for erosion of community; they have also lacked consensus on
the nature of the community in question. Since definitions of community can be
numerous, this has only added to the cloudiness of the communitarian charge. While
all communitarians seem to be alluding to a communal structure below the national
society level, they all seem to lack consensus on the identity of this community.
MacIntyre envisions a type of small city-state; Taylor would allow the community to
exist also as a cultural identity lacking fixed borders; Sandel and Walzer stress the
plurality of communal attachments both horizontally and vertically and focus more on·
1

the loss of fraternity within them. What seems to have been the order that originally
motivated communitarians into their position is: (a) the sense of loss of fraternity within
modem societies, a charge liberals will not nece~rily deny. Then (b) in assessing the
cause of the problem communitarians have pointed to a greater intrusion of the larger
liberal state which has assentedly promoted asocial individualism and usurped the
autonomy of sub-communities intailing the weakening of communal bonds. This has
then led to (c) their solution, which is the justification for the empowerment of
communal moral authority in order to reestablish the oneness of community. Since the
accuracy of points (b) and (c), is problematic, this still leaves point (a), the problem. If
liberal solutions to this problem are to be entertained, the site of the community in
danger should have some definable parameters. In order to accomplish this task, this
chapter will first develop a recognizable site for the
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community in question; then it will develop the characteristics of this site which may
prove it important to a liberal system. Lastly, it will place this concept of community in
relation to the larger national community. If a workable form of community is
developed here, there will then be a greater coherence when applying community to
liberal thought in the following chapters.
If communitarians are in agreement that the community they each wish to
defend has been significantly erroded by the application of certain liberal principles, the
first requirement in focusing on a common site for community should be that it is
presently endangered.

Present perception of loss of community has been more

commonly viewed to be at the local and subculture levels. Both of these areas also tend
to be the dominant topics of discussion from communitarian writings.

This would

seem to weaken the focus on the national society since the extent of national communal
bonds, "nationalism", has remained fairly static with minor fluctuations in both
directions in times of threat and well being. This would also seem to exclude
associations, whose membership appears to have merely transferred to different types
of associations. Therefore, if community was to be defined by its significant loss of
robust communal attachments, traditional local communities may emerge as the closest
definition. Communitarians, however, seem to declare that communities defined by
place (territorial), common history (cultural), and direct interaction (local) are all
endangered. The idea, dominant in communitarian thought, that individuals are
members of many different communities establishes multiple sites for community.
However, as communitarians combine various form s of community under one broad
concept, the important differences of their structures leads to problems when applying
principles regarding authority.
The second requirement is that the community in question possess traditional
territorial borders. Without identifiable borders of political authority, propositions on
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collective authority present not only unfeasible but possibly illiberal solutions. It
would be hard to imagine members of an ethnic subgroup dispersed throughout a
nation living under a different authority than their fell ow citizens. This would then
exclude subcultures as the site of community, leaving the concept of localities.
However, there is another reason why subcultures may fail to conform to the
requirements of traditional community in question.
The third requirement holds that a community must have the potential to provide
for the basic social and economic needs of its members. This requirement is necessary
on both functional and historic grounds. Functionally, if what is sought is greater
autonomy of communities, surely their authority would be compromised if they were
not relatively self sufficient. Historically this requirement is one that has been used to
4

define community by sociologists. This has also been a major flaw in the
communitarian definition and solution to the problem. The tendency by
communitarians to stress community origin as moral oneness rather than socioeconomic dependencies has distorted realities. History actually reveals community
motivation is substantially based on mutual socio-economic need, that the moral
oneness of past communities ~ad emerged out of social influences and cooperation.

5

The past does not provide evidence of conflictless communities within liberal states.
Instead, the oneness communitarians may be refering to is a sense of voluntary social
'

conformity tempered by the realities of socio-economic dependencies for survival not
found in modem communities of scales which no longer solely provide these needs.
Therefore, to restore the communal bonds which fostered cooperation, greater
economic self-sufficiency of communities might be entertained rather than illiberal
notions of greater moral authority.
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This third requirement also reveals another insight into the communitarian
perception of the problem. Although the nation state is often excluded as the site of the
desired community here it cannot be necessarily excluded. The evolution from local to
national community as the provider of basic social and economic needs has changed the
nature of social interaction among individuals. This change in the way people interact
with one another has been intertwined in the charge communitarians voice as the loss of
the "robust" nature of community. It is due to the indirect nature of community at the
national level and the probability of greater diversity that communitarians hold that
6

robust community cannot be achieved. This has flavored the communitarian position
as one which seeks to reestablish the closed gemeinschaft, a claim liberals hold is in
error for not perceiving existential realities. This is an important point in that robust
community at the national level may be impossible due to its structure. However, it
opens up the question, which will surface later, how much of the evolution toward
greater national reliance is natural and inevitable and how much could be political?
Questions of siting aside, it is necessary to examine the attributes of community
as it provides the foundations for examining their presence in liberal thought. Perhaps
the single most consistent principle of community is the liberal idea of subsidiarity.

7

This concept is based on the principle that the existence of small democratic collectives
can enhance the individual's choice and control over hiSlher environment in some areas
of decision making better than larger systems can. Therefore, if more local control
strengthens liberal principles, its existence becomes crucial to a liberal system. The
premise here is that not all local and regional problems of concern affect the larger
system, and such decisions are best left to those individuals who would be affected by
them. The overriding concept here is not that local community has a right of existence,
but rather that liberal systems should gravitate toward structures that will strengthen
individual choice.
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Whereas the idea of subsidiarity develops a structuraVfunctional basis for local
community within liberal systems, the idea of direct individual interaction between
members of a community can add another dynamic to be assessed. This is important
since it is a relationship which can only be experienced at the local level. The benefit to
liberalism here is psychological and educational. A key criticism by communitarians
has been that alienation, or asocialism, altering this direct relationship due to a greater
8

intrusion by the larger national system. This communal alienation may be compared to
Marx's concept of worker alienation. Whereas Marx's worker lost identity and
concern for his product due to loss of control to a larger indirect system, the individuals
of a community have lost identification with and concern for other members of the
community since they no longer maintain a share and control of their environment.
Where it may be true that the coercion of"need" was the bond of direct community,
the reliance on the larger system did not eliminate need but only relocated it. The
benefit of the more direct system to liberalism may be psychological and educational in
the sense that it may be easier to comprehend the social and economic dependencies at a
more direct level where they can be experienced, than at an abstract level where they
can only be imagined. Reliance on the larger system has tended to psychologically
cloak economic interdependencies and foster a false sense of self-sufficient
individualism. It has been a common liberal theme to view small direct communities as
an educational tool in which one is able to perceive and act directly in a political
9

environment. The directness of the situation also provides the sense of ownership and
identity which fosters greater concern and less apathy toward the system. It should be
stated here again this benefit of the direct system should not be perceived as a
replacement for regional and national systems, for liberal thought holds these larger
systems as capable of correcting the inadequacies of the smaller ones.
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The last concept to be discussed here is the necessary relationship ofthe larger
national system to the local community. Any discussion ofthe role of local community
within liberal thought cannot be taken outside of the context of the national system.
This reality is due to two important requirements of the nation state within liberal
thought which will be developed further in the following chapters. The first concept
deals with the Hobbsean reality of the nation state as necessary evolutionary form for
security. This expression states that the nation state has a natural and primary function
to protect its inhabitants from outside invasion.

10

The evolution of larger and larger

forms of collective authority to grant this security is a reality witnessed by the evolution
from the feudal state to the nation state. The nation state is the culmination of this
evolution and has existed from the inception of liberal thought to the present. This is
an undisputed role of the nation state as a political system. However, the role of the
nation state as a liberal system provides another requirement at the national level, which
is the role as custodian for the maximization of self realization within that nation. This
task is not to create "rights", but to allow the environment for equal rights to be
maintained. Both of these roles ofthe nation state are not to be limited by subsystems
within it. This is the reality in which local governments of liberal systems must operate
within. The chore of the research for community within liberal thought will be to try
to extract the role oflocal community from within these realities of the nation state.
The problem becomes separating and justifying the overlapping roles ofauthority
between individual, community, and nation.
Part ofthis problem lies in the historic interpretations ofthe idea ofsovereignty.
Whereas in liberal thought the idea of sovereignty was to rest ultimately with the
individual, there has been debate on the delegation ofsovereign power to national and
local governments. The prevailing liberal notion is that the individual retains
sovereignty through the expression of "the people", and that the "people" are

considered the national society whose vehicle ofexpression is the national government.
The United States liberal system reflects this idea where local community has been
considered only a "creation" ofthe state government sovereignty whose sovereignty
may be limited by the "people" or national government. This idea oflocal government
as only creations ofthe state, an American precedent referred to as Dillon's Rule,
denied any prior expression of sovereignty with this direct form ofgovernment.
Certain liberal critics ofDillon's Rule have maintained that local community was prior
to state and national systems. They hold that where local communities were voluntarily
formed of individuals seeking to secure their own individual sovereignty, so were
states formed of communities each seeking to maintain their own sovereignty. They
believe that while both the individual and the community in each circumstance
surrendered some autho rity, they did not surrender it all but only what was necessary
to enhance their situation. The claim here is not that the nation state should be
subordinate to local communities, but rather that there exists a certain reserved area of
the local community that national government must observe.

11

In the next four chapters there will be an examination ofthe history ofliberal
thought in order to assess the role of community in it. The purpose of this chapter was
to give a workable shape to the concept of community which will assist in the
assessment of community within liberalism. Three questions will be advanced through
the progression of liberal theory in search of precedents for the role of community.
The first question will try to discover how community has been perceived as an entity.
The second question will focus on the liberal stance on the authority of a collective
(community) in relation to the individual. The third question will inquire about the
liberal perception of "progress" as a neutral force. Where the first and second
questions will hope to arrive at the nature of community, the third question is aimed at
the forces which may be affecting communal bonds. Since it has been agreed upon by
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most sociological researchers that it has been the technological impact on the
environment that has been the source of changing community, not the absence of moral
authority charged by communitarians, one may question the nature of progress in
liberal thought.

12

If changes due to technological advancement are conceived as a

intrinsically good, then this would imply a positive moral stance and dictate
government neutrality toward change upon the environment. This position would lead
one to view the erosion of traditional community as natural, inevitable, and desireable.
However, if the effects of change could be considered negative as well as positive and
affected by political influence then liberals must assume a positive role for government
since their decisions are the creators of its direction. This position, which allows
government intervention, forces government to assess the importance of traditional
community to liberal principles if it is to protect it. The following case study will be
helpful in developing the problems which enter into the search for community's role.
In February of 1996, ABC's television program Nightline in a segment titled
"Just Plain Folks" exposed a situation concerning the dynamics of community
authority. In this situation a small town in New Hampshire was fighting the
construction of a national chain drug store in their community. The fear by the majority
of the town was that this addition would change the nature of the town. The town had
prided itself in remaining free of influences from outside interests. This had allowed
the town to become a type of gemeinschaft haven for those who live there as well as an
attraction to visitors from the outside. Research had revealed that when this national
chain had entered other communities it was only a matter of time before its discount
prices would drive other competing local concerns out of business. Citizens feared not
only a loss of individual character of their town but also a loss of control to outside
economic interests and the bureaucratic personality it suggested. The question this case
study implies which will continually surface in this thesis is whether a community
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collective can protect itself from the free trade of the larger national system without
exerting a moral influence on the members of that community or restricting the liberty
of those wishing to enter the community. It also implies that other than economic and
political demands of community, there may also be esthetic demands. The obvious
solution to this problem which does not restrict individual choice would be to allow the
national chain to enter and if the citizens wish the chain to leave, they simply should not
shop there. However, past experience may reveal that individuals would shop there
even though as a collective they did not support its existence. This exposes a concept
dominant in liberal thought concerning the role of collectives. The belief here is that the
role of a collective is that it serves as a disciplinary tool for individuals to protect
themselves from the temptation of their own lower level motives which conflict with
higher level motives they desire.
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An example would be the legal framework provided

by liberal systems concerning monogamous marriage. The existence of this framework
helps to deter individuals from engaging in multiple sexual relationships and helps to
sustain the lifestyle of the traditional nuclear family. Without this added legal incentive,
the temptation to pursue multiple relationships would increase since the experience
itself is not necessarily an undesirable one for individuals, and some may claim is an
attractive one. However, individuals may also desire the familiarity and security of the
traditional monogamous relationship. Since the free choice action to engage in multiple
partners appears to be biological and its satisfaction short term, it is considered a lower
case motive. Since the desire to form monogamous relationships appears to be one of
logical organization with long term implications, not to mention moral socialization, it
is deemed higher order. Because the lower order impulses play on the weaknesses of
the individual, individuals empower collectives to remove those temptations when they
can present an alternative which is also desirable to human reason. The implication of
this example is to show that collectives have been asked to do more than provide an
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efficient method of satisfying basic individual needs. The following chapter will
embark on the development of liberal theory, which will hopefully provide some of the
answers to the question of role of community.
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CHAPTER IV
EARLY INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISM
Before embarking on the early industrial pericxl it is important to mention the
foundations of liberalism established in the 17th and 18th Centuries which preceded
this period. A brief synopsis of this pre-industrial period will add a greater continuity
to development of liberal principles within this thesis, and help to achieve a better
understanding of the influences on liberal thought in the early industrial pericxl. The
reason this pre-industrial period is not being developed in full is due to the fact that the
idea of community in liberal thought was not fully developed at this time. The main
priority of this time was justification for the liberation of the individual from traditional
authoritarian control, and community was not considered an endangered entity.
Though Locke emerges as the dominant liberal interpretation leading into the early
industrial period, the works of Hobbes, Rousseau, Burke, Hume and Kant have all
had an impact on the development of liberal theory.
Pre-Industrial Liberalism
Though Thomas Hobbes is often associated with the theory for the justification
of authoritarian rule, his long-standing ·contribution to liberal thought was the
conception of the social contract. Hobbes employed a method of rational, rather than
empirical, cause and effect relationships to validate his theory. His theory uses a state
of nature as its foundation. This state of nature assumes that the individual is
autonomous. This was a radical departure from the organic view of society which was
dominant, and becomes the seed of individualism which will envelop liberalism.
49
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Hobbes saw community not as organic, but rather a voluntary association to serve selfinterests. Recognition of the autonomous individual established by the social contract
would be furthered by Locke to become the groundwork of liberalism. I
John Locke, now witness to the reduction of power of the monarchy in the
quiet revolution of 1688 and its recognition of religious toleration, set about like
Hobbes to justify the vacuum left by weakening authority. Building on Hobbes'
conception of the state of nature, Locke, through more empirical reasoning, developed
what was to be the dominant liberal interpretation of the period. Locke realized the lack
of morality in Hobbes' state of nature. Influenced by Hooker yet tempered by a new
religious toleration, Locke established through a common sense approach a foundation
of prior morality within the state of nature. This created an individual who desired
2

more than simple power. In fact, Locke's rational individual was not necessarily
asocial but cared for the well-being of others. It is important to note that Locke
assumes that the rational individual will freely choose basic Christian moral principles
as guides of behavior in the state of nature. Locke's individual, equipped with his/her
moral wiring, possesses God given unalienable rights. The individual, armed with
these rights, then enters into a relationship with a collective authority to protect these
3

rights. Locke's contributions to liberal theory helped make individual rights a
working concept, and establish the individual as prior to political entites.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau ~ffered an alternative view of the state of nature which
led him to place the collective will of individuals above the will of the lone individual.
He believed the individual in the state of nature to be pure and that promotion of
individualism has caused selfish desires to corrupt the original harmonious existence of
society. Rousseau's belief in an organic relationship between the individual and the
community led him to establish the idea of a common good. The articulation of this
good would be the General Will and the General Will would be expressed by popular
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democracy. Though both Locke and Rous.5eau both desired to free individuals from
traditional authoritarian control, their solutions exposed the difference between
democracy and liberalism. Though RoUs.5eau offered a more democratic solution than
Locke, Rousseau solution would be considered illiberal in that it does not provide the
individual the protection from a tyranny of the majority. However, Rousseau realized
the plurality of a nation state and saw greater potential in smaller entities in obtaining a
5

sense of the common good. The basic foundational differences between Rous.5eau
and Locke would continue to the contemporary liberaVcommunitarian debate.
Edmund Burke's criticism of liberalism's revolutionary nature questioned the
role that "order'' plays in liberal thought. Although Burke's criticism of the selfdestructive nature ofliberal theory labeled him as the father of conservatism, it would
be deceptive to label him as authoritarian. As a member of the British Parliament, he
was a strong proponent of rights for Americans, Irishmen, and Indians. Burke's
vision of rights had a new prerequisite; order. He believed that rights could not survive
without an environment of order. Prudence was notably the central theme of Burke's
theory. He viewed institutions and traditions as the stabilizing forces upon the
environment that would allow for the further realization of rights. Burke's criticisms
tended to soften the earlier revolutionary tones ofliberalism.

6

David Hume's ideas, much like Hobbes', did not receive immediate acceptance.
Both had ideas which appeared too atheistic and scientific for the status quo mentality.
However, Hume's works were aimed at the destruction of the social contract theory
that Hobbes had initiated. Hume's "skepticism" challenged the validity of the social
contract by claiming it to be unprovable by measurable standards. He believed that
there is no way of empirically proving the existence of anything beyond sensory
perception. Though he declared that morality was simply a emotional response to pain
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and pleasure, he held value in time-honored customs which have proven to be useful to
individuals. He held that communities were simply a creation of human utility and
gained their value in that respect. Hume would not only contribute to the contemporary
liberal tendency to avoid metaphysical assumptions, but he also advanced the idea of
utility which will be built upon later by the utilitarians.

8

Immanuel Kant became the synthesizer, like Locke, of the dilemmas of religion
and science, and the individual and authority. Kant's motivation for his theory was to
answer the moral void left by Hume's skepticism. Kant did this by creating a theory of
duality of existence. He believed that the mind has both active and passive capabilities.
The passive mind simply records sense perception of the physical world and the active
mind can draw on a priori knowledge from the spiritual world of God. This created a
bridge between the empirical strength of Hume's physical world and the moral wiring
of Locke's individual in the state of nature. The important impact Kant left on liberal
thought was that individual free will would be held to ethical standards. His
development of the categorical imperative placed a general moral prerequisite on the
expression of rights. This morality not only conveys the idea of equality of
individuals, but also that individual actions may impact the liberty of others. Finally,
Kant's development of the individual as a recipient of a priori knowledge places greater
authority on the individual to pursue his/her conception of the good. This stronger
faith in individual also helped to strengthen individualism in the early industrial period.
Bentham
Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism will symbolize this period just as Locke's
social contract had dominated the last period. In fact, Bentham's utilitarian direction
would continue to influence liberal thought as late as the l 920's.

10

Though his liberal

9
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interpretation was to be considered more of a Lockean individual approach rather than
the more collective approach of Rousseau, he flatly denied Locke's metaphysical and
historical basis of rights. More in line with Hobbes and Hume, Bentham perceived a
positivistic existence of man, that cause/effect and experience has shaped the present
state of affairs, not a predetermined claim of right gained through historical
rationalization. In fact, Bentham held great contempt for hsitorical foundations of
rights claiming that it has been used to justify unequal wealth and power for the self.
interest of a few. The few to whom Bentham was refering were the landed aristocracy
who had gained a monopoly of economic and political power in the wake of further
reductions of power of the monarchy. Bentham's enemy was different than Locke's
which called for a different focus on the individual. Where Locke needed history to
empower the individual with rights, Bentham needed to do away with historical rights
(legal entitlements) to free individuals from other individuals.

11

In order to accomplish this task, Bentham builds on Hume's utility function to
state that the state of man is experience and reaction. This emphasizes the focus of the
individual as center, and utility as the driving force of action. Then to fill the void of
enlightened purpose left by Hume, Bentham added the Happiness Principle. This
principle was built on the idea that it is the primary motivation of humans to seek
pleasure and avoid pain. Therefore the "good" of a society is pleasure or happiness,
and a collective of individuals should always act to maximize the happiness of its
members. The method to accomplish happiness is reform, and the tool to implement
reform would be legislation.

12

Bentham would base reform on the practical rather than

rational. A society must always ask the question, "Is there a better way available to
maximize the aggregate individual happiness?". Burke's tradition and incrementalism
would not be sacred. Bentham would spare no tradition to the idea of increased
happiness of the status quo. The vehicle of reform was the law which was to be
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enacted by a legislative body representative of the diversiy of interests of the collective.
t

This is where Bentham had great criticism of Locke's implication of natural
entitlements and, specifically, Blackstone's justifications of common law. Bentham's
legal reforms would not honor what he termed habits of the past, but rather would limit
legislation to provable welfare improvements. These improvements would be subject
to a mathematical calculation of units of individual happiness and their increase of
happiness relative to the status quo. The idea of pleasure being prior to rights has
always tabled the utilitarian interpretation of liberalism as a hedonistic philosophy. It is
historically evident that Bentham's utilitarianism created the highly individualistic
elements found in some contemporary liberal interpretations and profoundly adopted by
recent libertarians.
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Bentham, like Hume, viewed community as a fictitious entity lacking any
intrinsic qualities beside practical utility for the individual. He tended to speak of
community at the national level and make no great distinctions below that level. The
good of community to Bentham was that it was a practical invention of man, not
necessarily of metaphysical origin.

14

However, in an interesting tum of philosophy, it

could be said that Bentham did not value liberty above individual happiness; rather, he
tied individual happiness to the maximization of happiness of the majority of a given
society. It could be concluded from Bentham's approach that the collective association
of individuals was a given. This was a necessary environment for his legislative
reform to take place. Unlike Jacobian revolutionary change, Bentham still preferred to
leap from the status quo, not destroy it.

15

Therefore, the community, though it was not

naturally empowered, was to be practically empowered in Bentham's state.

16

If it was

to be congruent with his idea of a minimal state, a case could be made that the smaller
community may have better served Bentham's happiness principle.
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Bentham's individualism did not necessarily derive from the theory that the
state lose its authority, but rather that the authority be geared solely to individual
happiness. Though he saw this state as a minimal state, the state had gained authority
in an area it had not operated in before. It would be fair to say that he promoted a state
that would definitely lack the overall areas of authority it controlled in the past. By
reducing these limitations on human behavior, Bentham is seen as placing greater
liberties in the hands of individuals. However, where he reduces the scope of power
of the collective, he also creates a new power of the collective in empowering a
legislature to monitor the relative happiness of the status quo, and when proven viable,
enforce reform measures to increase aggregate individual happiness. To soften the
f

effect of this collective force, Bentham required government be a re lection of the
individual elements of the community. Representation to Bentham was to be more
inclusive than many of his liberal predecessors or his utilitarian followers. He
envisioned a larger parliament with interests that reflect the diversity of the population,
and with a strong one person one vote requirement.
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The precedent set here is that

Bentham perceived a collective force as necessary and legitimate tool for furthering the
collective welfare other than order and protection. In order for Bentham to challenge
the individual advantage of the Tory based status quo, he needed to not only disprove
historical entitlements, but also disable the power of the deviant individual's claim to
happiness before the group. In essence, Bentham did not fear a tyranny of the majority
situation, though his check on the majority limited it to action only if it increased
18
aggregate happiness.
It is interesting, however, that Bentham did not perceive a direct relationship
between the political and the economic areas of individual life. This allowed him to
justify a state which was neutral in economic exchange between individuals. This
created a unique and powerful association of this time. The rapid industrializ.ation of

56
the time in concert with Bentham's political utilitarianism and Smith and Ricardo's
economic theories produced a movement called philosophical radicalism, the liberation
of individuals in the economic sphere from the legal constraints of the past. It is in this
area that Bentham's individualism appeared more libertarian and less populist.
However, Bentham did not use the premise, like Smith and Ricardo, that the economic
sphere is "natural", but rather that it should be left alone for the better actualiz.ation of
individual happiness. It could therefore be drawn that Bentham saw the effects of
progress as it affected community, something that could be limited but only if it
increased happiness. Happiness would be measured by tests of how intense, long,
certain, and remote the actual experience of aggregate individual happiness would be.
The the idea of community or the idea of progress would be subservient to individual
happiness.

19

Coleridge
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, poet and philosopher, was to represent the dominant
force opposing Bentham's utilitarianism in the early industrial liberal period. In fact, J.
S. Mill, who would inherit the dominant liberal position by the end of this period,
claimed Coleridge and Bentham to be the two opposing figures of the 19th Century.
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Coleridge's position is drawn from the vein of political philosophy stemming from
Rousseau and filtered through Kant and his followers. As this philosophy spread
through Europe and America, it became known as Romanticism. Building on the ideas
of Rousseau, Coleridge believed in the organic nature of existence. He utilized the
organic view to create a pantheistic view of universe which would later lead to the
idealistic movement. Like Kant, Coleridge believed the mind to be active not passive.
This active nature allowed man to gain knowledge "transcendentally'' from his organic
world, to which he was linked to spiritually not scientifically.

21

Different from
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Rousseau and Kant, Coleridge stressed the ideas of Nature and the Hero. Coleridge's
Romanticism was in great part a reaction to industrialization as it was toward
individualism. Technology, as much as it had threatened nature also tended to tame its
threatening character. Nature provided to Coleridge a necessary spiritual bond as well
as a link to transcendental knowledge. Due to this organic relationship, an intrinsic
equality and interdependence was assumed between individuals. The awareness of
individuals and their universe as one interdependent organism with a spiritual
obligation to respect and provide for the welfare of each other, was to be morally
superior to individual hedonism. However, the Romantic movement was affected by
the freeing of the individual noticeable in this period and seized upon this popular
notion to justify the "Hero".
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Though Coleridge believed in Kant's categorical imperative to stress a natural
equality of individuals, he also stressed that individual talents were not necessarily
equal. In fact, he believed that nature provides some individuals talents greater than
others, and that it is the obligation of those more talented to act for the benefit for the
whole. The goal of the hero was to protect the emotional beauty which bonded the
whole.
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Coleridge revolted heavily against the scientific method initiated by Locke

which he believed to be grossly distorted by the Bentham's happiness calculation. To
Coleridge, poetry was superior not equal to pushpin, for it revealed the emotional
bonds of reality, not the contrived and unemotional calculative method. To Coleridge,
utilitarian liberalism not only shattered the harmony of the whole, but it also leveled the
richness of society by reducing it to practicality.
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Coleridge, like Burke, had a great respect for the historic development of
institutions. He tended to favor Rousseau's preference for a rural community as
opposed to the larger industrial or statist community. He envisioned a rural
squirearchy knit together by a common memory of identity. His identification with the
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local community was not in that it provided a greater democratic forum, but rather
ironically it enhanced individual identity by sustaining the emotional ties of individuals
to each other which were dulled by focus on the bureaucratic nature of the larger
community. In essence, the problems enforcement of communal obligations would be
largely avoided if intimate relationships rather than legal relationships existed.
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Unlike Rousseau, Coleridge did not see direct democracy as the adequate
protector of the natural state. He believed the welfare of society to be greater concern
than the desires of the deviant individual, but feared popular democracy as too
dangerous for the individuals within it. Coleridge spelled out that there were now three
classes in modem democratic states; the aristocracy, the capitalists, and the laborers.
He saw the laborers as powerless due to both economic and educational deprivation.
This then created a natural power struggle between the aristocracy and the capitalists.
He saw the capitalists, the new industrial middle-class associated with Bentham's
utilitarianism, as the reason for the misery of the laborer. Further expansion of political
power to the capitalist class would empower this group over the other two, and lead to
a hedonistic material world and eventual class warfare. He saw the aristocracy as the
paternal force which would protect humanity from its self-destruction by providing the
moral guidance necessary. Though vague and shallow on the procedures and
institutions of this political authority, there are strong implications of a Platonic
philosopher king paternalism manifested in the practice of a system of limited
democracy.
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Coleridge's condemnation of the growing force of industrialization and its
ensuing hedonism placed him in a position to view the progress of society non
neutrally To Coleridge, the protection of ways of life was superior to individual
contributions which could alter those ways. Due to his more organic construction of
society, Coleridge did not see the economic system as separate from the political or
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social system. Progress would be judged on its contribution to social harmony rather
than to individual happiness, progress could be limited in the economic sphere as well
as the political. As stated earlier, Coleridge sensed a shift of philosophy in the wake of
the industrial revolution, man could now control nature rather than fear it. To
Coleridge, it was to be man in harmony with nature, a new equality which seemed
threatened by the capitalist's minimal state which did not recognize the full nature of
man by creating a new unnatural environment of asocial individual competition.

27

J. S. Mill
John Stuart Mill would end up reforming utilitarian thought by tempering it
with the criticisms of Coleridge. In many ways, he would join Locke as one of the
dominant liberal inte rpreters of Anglo-American liberalism. Mill would leave upon the
20th Century the desired nature of individualism. He did this by placing liberty above
happiness as the dominant good of liberal thought. To Mill, happiness is not an end
but a process, and that process depends upon the liberty to pursue it.
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Under severe

indoctrination of Utilitarian thought by his father James Mill, a primary disciple of
Bentham, Mill did not begin to challenge strict utilitarianism until his father's death. It
has been noted that what helped him recover from a nervous breakdown due to this
strict utilitarian indoctinization was the reading of poetry and philosophy, which was
scorned by utilitarian beliefs. This is where Mill became influenced by Coleridge and
Comte, and formed a friendship with Carlyle who was noted Romantic of Coleridge's
weight. It is with these later associations that Mill had judged utilitarianism as deficient
in assessing the true nature of the individual, who was both rational and emotional.
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was Mill's reaction to his one-sided schooling and his Catholicism, which sought the
good in everything, that created his high personal regard for "open mindedness" and
influenced him to synthesize utilitarianism and romanticism. However, his stronger

It
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utilitarian influences created a type of self-imposed guilt which would not allow him to
stray too far from its foundations. Later critics have assessed that Mill did not go as far
as he had wanted to. What he did contribute was to add humanism to a barren utilitarian
philosophy, which inevitably created a distinct new liberal interpretation.
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It could be said that Mill's liberalism was to become the most individualistic
stance created, since it implied a diversity or pluralism of individual ends. Mill's
criticism was not of government but rather of civil society, which could not only
control government but could also act outside of its authority. What Mill was
promoting was individual rights, but enforced in a positivistic rather than on a Lockean
naturalistic foundation. Due to the assumption that individuals find different avenues
for happiness, the majority should never limit the deviant's interpretation or fulfillment
of that happiness unless it creates a "direct" danger to the liberty or life of others. This
interpretation is an evident influence on American constitutional interpretation of rights
as seen in the Clear and Present Danger Doctrine. To Mill, the free individual was
noble, and the liberal society necessary for a liberal government was one that respected
free expression, tolerance, and nonconformity.
maintain intellectual stimulation.
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To Mill, the deviant was necessary to
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Mill was responsible for shifting the focus of debate toward community as an
entity to be seriously weighed in the relationship of an individual and hi&'her
government. Though he made n·o specific description of community, his examples
conveyed the limitations placed on individuals by more local communities. His focus
on the desired nature of a liberal community reflected individuals who interact
directly.
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As previously mentioned, Mill did not entertain the idea of liberal structure

as much as he had developed liberal attitude of the community. In his strongest
references to the entity of community, Mill stated that it was the community's role to
socialize youth to the moral standards agreed on by the community, and furthered this
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by saying that no community has the right to force another community to adopt its
moral standards.
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Though much weaker in its explanation, Mill also implied an

economic interdependency of community members which denoted certain obligations
limiting rights.
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Where Bentham saw evil in a collective minority exercising power over a
collective majority, Mill saw evil in the collective majority exercising power over the
individual. To Mill, authority should not be geared toward a collective happiness, but
rather to the individual to choose his or her own happiness. However, this did not
imply a minimalist state, but rather one active in protecting the environment necessary
to promote individual liberty. However, this protection did not extend to creation of a
social good; i.e, a paternal sense of what is good for the individual, but rather
protection of individual choice of the good. Government was to stop what is evil rather
than enforce what is good, and what was evil was the limitation of individual choice
without endangering others. Mill desired a collective authority limited by the principles
of individual liberty, but comprised of unequal representation of the population. He
feared the tyranny of the majority and though he promoted open public dialogue, he
reserved decision making to those with superior education.
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Besides the impact left by Mill's liberty priority, his application of this principle
through government was vague and at times conflicting. As his writings progressed,
he tended to be affected by the changes in the environment around him. In his later
writings, he was much more tolerant to limitations by a community. His skeptical
view of the role of religion was transformed into a human need for spirituality. His
early promotion of individualist capitalism became more limited, in which some now
say he was the predecessor of Fabian socialism. He did not see the economic system
as natural and would allow legislation of it for humanitarian reasons. Though he held
strongly to individual right to production, he wavered on the right of distribution.
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Probably affected by the ugly tum of the industrial revolution, Mill doubted whether
technology had truly benefited the lot of mankind, realizing the non-neutral effects it
could produce. This latter fear of Mill's, was to become a dominant concern of future
liberal philosophers.
Hegel
Georg Wihlelm Friedrich Hegel was to become the counterweight to Mill's
liberalism, and in synthesizing the Rousseau's "General Will" and Burke's respect of
history with the objective idealism of the Romantic movement, would impact political
theory into the modem age. The sheer volume of his work and the massive system
building far exceeded theories of the past which were more based on critical analysis.

38

Hegel attempted to reverse the process initiated by Descartes offocusing on the parts
rather than the whole. The expansive nature of his philosophy often left it vulnerable to
contradictions and vagueness, though it could be distilled down to two main ideas: the
nature of history, and the relationship of the state and the individual. Following the
lead of Burke, Hegel saw in history the unfolding of human purpose. Due to the
radical changes of political history he recorded, Hegel saw logical patterns emerge.
Hegel felt that for the first time man has been able to "stand back" and view human
histo ry from afar. It was not the surface cause and effect reactions of short-term
history, but rather the time-honored history that revealed truths of human purpose.
This purpose, to Hegel, was the divine purpose of God or what Hegel saw as logic.
The tool which exposed the logic was the dialectical method. The dialectical method
allowed Hegel to do what Burke, Rousseau, and even Locke were unable to do, and
39
that was to justify a type of natural law without being accused of pure intuitionism.
Through the use of the method Hegel now had"proot'' that history was a logical
progression of idea"A", challenged by idea "B'' exposing the inherent danger in"A"
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which causes a synthesis to "C" which creates temporar equilibrium until idea "D"
uses the inherent weaknesses of "C" to create a synthesis which is "E". Progress is
seen as a constant correction of the staus quo. The significance of progress is the
gradual revelation of the purpose of Mankind, or God's Will.

40

The importance of this

exercise is based on the organic nature of existence. The key to Hegel's claim is that
the state and the individual are only components to a greater universal purpose.
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Hegel's historical interpretation removes the individual as the author of history.
Instead, the individual becomes the tool of the motivation of world (God) forces.
Individuals act off the cues provided by the environment. To Hegel, the evolution of
history has provided an insight into the desired political system. He saw the fairly
recent evolution of the nation state out of the feudal period as a step toward political
perfection. Hegel's philosophy concerning the elevation of the nation state as the
highest form of political perfection may be in part due to the status of the German states
in which he existed. In comparison to France and England, Germany was highly
decentralized and less economically developed. Hegel envied the strength of nations,
and Germany would languish behind; yet he worried that the rights movements within
42
France and England would eventually erode the unity which made them strong.
Hegel was liberal in the sense that he saw the nation state as the true protector of
individual liberties.
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However, he saw that to preserve rights a strong state was

needed, and there must be a balance of rights to obligations to empower a strong state.
Therefore, in Hegel's hierarchy the state must be prior to rights, for without the state
there are no rights.
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In reference to individual freedom, Hegel believed that freedom is

a mental creation of a society. He separated freedom from biological needs, which are
non-volunteeristic. He associated freedom with wants or motives of action which are
not controlled by the individual but values reflective of the social environment. True
freedom to Hegel was the freedom to knowledge. Hegel was confident that knowledge
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would provide individual's realization of the world force, and the freedom to contribute
toward it. Hegel was confident that knowledge would frame liberty to only purposeful
action. Therefore, collective action was of greater significance than individual action.
Hegel was in fact promoting "social liberty'', which haunted Mill in his sparing
limitations of individual liberty.
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Hegel's use of community was rather loose. His comment that the greatest
entity of mankind is the community manifested through the state (nation) has some of
the same confusion as Rousseau's General Will. This could be due to the meshing of
the particular and the general in his development of the organic theory. Hegel's entities
would start with the individual, who lacks authority alone due to the fact that freedom
is socially created and promoted by the aggregate individual will. The next step of
assimilation would be the levels family, neighborhood, associations, local community
and society. To Hegel, these were creators of the social, economic and cultural
identities of the system. However, Hegel believed this level could not sustain the order
needed for security, rights and progression without the moral direction and authority of
the political nation state. To Hegel, although the state was sovereign, its role was not
to create the economic and social arrangements, that was the role of the community; the
state, however, had the power to check the arrangements to the moral standards of the
whole through use of constitutional law.
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Though highly statist, Hegel's would allow the authority of local community to
be superior to individual right if it did not encroach upon rights granted by the nation
state. His faith that a collective authority is superior to the decision making of the
individual is evident. Hegel holds strict requirements for this collective in that he
feared both the extremes of anarchy and tyranny which would erode individual self
realization. He reserved political authority only to the educated class, and went further
to maintain that this class must be insulated from self or special interests so as to allow
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its decisions to be based purely on the general welfare and moral purpose of the state.
Like Plato, Hegel envisioned a philosopher king. The belief in a monarchy is based on
the fact that a strong monarchy became the bridge from feudalism to the nation state for
England and France. However, Hegel saw the monarch as more of a necessary focus
or figurehead of state will than an actual political authority. The real essence of state
power would be endowed upon the state ministers. The ministers would be drawn
from the "ruling class" mentioned above. They would be protectors of constitutional
law, very similar in authority to the U.S. Supreme Court. The ministers would be
advised by a elected legislative body represented by functions of society rather than
population or geography. The significance of Hegel's empowerment of collective
authority is based first in the idea of an agreed upon rule oflaw, and secondly that an
educated and insulated collective authority is far more productive for the individuals of
a state than authority based on the majority decision of the dominant self-interest or the
lack of a collective authority allowing for directionless competition of self-interests.
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Hegel's development of history and collective authority hinge upon the premise
of predetermined purposeful direction of mankind. However, trying to relate Hegel's
view of the collective authority and its relationship to progress can be confusing.
Hegel's progress has no knowable destination, since it is a process of revelation.
Therefore, the state would seem to have to take a neutral stance toward innovations
which change social arrangements since it requires a distant stance from that change to
assess its impact. Yet, the protective authority of the state could impede some
innovations which do not align with the moral course of the state. Hegel would
probably answer this problem with the dialectic by stating that change would only
occur if the old idea failed by being unable to compete with the view of the new
synthesis. It is important to note that change does not occur from old idea to new idea,
but rather from old idea to synthesis of old and new. This stresses Hegel's belief in an
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evolutionary rather than a revolutionary change.

48

Hegel might state that some

technological forces in a society may be fought against if they are viewed as morally
destructive; however if they are destined to occur, due to divine will, they will succeed
and only future observation will detect their ultimate benefit.
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CHAPTERV

IATE INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISM
This period, which covers the twilight of the 19th Century through the dawn of
the 20th Century, is marked with a pessimism born of the exposure to the inhumane
experiences of the workplace and battlefield, of capitalism and nationalism. Both these
ideals, which were considered positive forces to the liberation of the individual, now
seemed to enslave individuals to their competitive desires. In almost a Hegelian
dialectic, both ideals had exposed their seeds of destruction. However, the synthesis
of ideas through this period will reconstruct both ideas and allow them to flourish.
This period will witness both the end of the monarchy and the domination of
capitalism. It will bestow upon the liberal tradition the ideas of the positive state and of
equal liberty.
Green
Thomas Hill Green has been recognized as the initiator of what will later be
called New Liberalism. His liberal philosophy, categorized as "Oxford Idealism",
would become the dominant liberal interpretation of the late 19th Century. Green had
felt that Mill had not gone far enough in softening the harsh hedonism of Bentham's
1

utilitarianism. Continuing Mill's respect for the individual, Green imported the ideas
of German idealism in an attempt to construct moral ethics into individualism, which he
had considered was barren in dominant British empiricism. Green's motivation was
his personal fear that virtue was in peril. On the one hand he saw the church, with its
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ridged dogma, rapidly losing its influence to an increasingly scientific world. Yet the
only alternative for individuals was amoral hedonism promoted by the utilitarian liberal.
2
Like Hegel, Green saw philosophy as the new moral compass for a new scientific age.
Green, often called a Hegelian Liberal, used Hegel's monistic idealism as the
metaphysical basis for liberalism. Green followed more the organic tradition of
Rousseau,the Romantics, and the German Idealists. His idealism focused on an
objective and monistic "good", which was more in tune with Hegel than Kant. It was
objective in the sense that it exists independently of the mind of the individual, yet
monistic in that there is one source for it. Rather than Hegel's more abstract "logic",
Green envisioned this source to be God. However important to Green's construction
of liberalism, the essence of God was to be understood more in the pantheistic quality
of Spinoza where God is found in all that exists. Green then works off this
construction to foster a perfectionist perspective. This is to say that since God is in all
then the individual has the potential to tap what is within oneself, to understand all and
arrive at perfection. This is also a similar to the transcendentalism of the Romantic
movement. However, Green's perfectionism denied the possibility of ever reaching
perfection, but rather focused on the struggle towards it. What Green hoped to arrive
at through his metaphysical foundation was a moral foundation for liberalism. His
3
metaphysical foundation would imply a common good.
Building upon this metaphysical foundation, Green would introduce a highly
democratic and individualistic procedural system that would classify him as the new
liberal. His procedural system is highly driven by an ethical assumption which is
closer to Kant than Hegel. Blending his pantheistic assumption with Kant's categorical
imperative, Green laid the basis for the ultimate respect for the individual often found in
Mill's writings. Though Green based his liberalism on a common good, the common
good could only be known through self-realization and self- realization could only be
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experienced voluntarily by the individual, not coerced. However, Green viewed
individual will as a much more complex process than Mill had. To Green, the "pure
good" existed as total knowledge of all or the mind of God, which is unobtainable
because of man's imperfections in the face of a constantly changing environment.
Then there was the "common good" which is the closest realization of the pure good by
the collective intelligence of a given community. Though the common good is partial,
it reflects the knowledge that is accrued to that point in history that all agree is good.
Green is quick to warn, though, that the common good is imperfect because it lacks
total knowledge, and must be monitored and debated to make it responsive to new
knowledge and a changing environment. It must not become dogmatic, though in its
imperfect form it still reflects the basic roots of the pure good. This partial pure good
therefore becomes the moral yeast of the common good. Green states that collective
intelligence is more apt to frame the common good since it gains access to greater
minds , it contains debate, and it reduces self-interest. As stated above, Green also
believed that the individual , through self-realization or "knowledge", would agree with
fell ow individuals on the monistic common good. This statement relies heavily on the
individual good, Green's third ~nd last "good". Unlike Hegel, Green believed that it
was individuals, not an exterior life force that motivated progress towards the good.

5

Green bracketed individual freed<;>m by two major premises. The first , similar to
Locke, is that free action should be logical action, and logical in the sense that it is not
harmful to the individual. The second premise is that the individual cannot be
perceived as separated from community, or other individuals. To Green, the logical
and only known existence of the individual is in context of the community. His view
of an abstract social contract could only be between the community and government not
between individual and government. Therefore government is not generated for the
impossible task of protecting "singular" individual self-interest, but rather individual,
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"common" interest. The common interest or common good then limits individual
freedom to action which does not harm the rational action of others. Rational action is
defined as action aimed at self-realization by the individual. The increased self
realization by the individual will ultimately lead to awareness of the pure good which
will reveal the individual's common interest with others which becomes the common
good. In essence, Green saw the pure good, common good, and individual good to be
of the same origin yet they each represent a different capacity for understanding.
Green saw the individual good as the perception of the good capable by the individual
alone, though it is generally a less reliable indicator of the pure good than the common
good due to personal limits on knowledge and strong competition with personal self
interest. Green placed high importance on this internal debate of lower and higher level
interests within the individual. First, Green would remove certain involuntary action of
individuals from the realm of individual choice/freedom. These would be certain
biological drives which overpower conscious decisionmaking. These are rational
instincts which if consciously fought would be detrimental to the health of the
individual, i.e., nourishment or sleep.
In the realm of voluntary action Green sees the core of the liberal debate in the
"possible" conflict between self-interest and the known common good. Green's
individual good is the self-realization that one's self-interest is also the common good.
However, what is most important here is the possibility of a situation where the
individual "has" a choice between one's perceived self-interest and knowledge of the
common good. This notion of choice is crucial to Green's status as a liberal. The
situation would arise when an individual is faced with a choice of action between a
lower level voluntary action, one whose motivation is purely self-indulgent with
known negative consequences to oneself or others, against higher level voluntary
action which is the knowledge of the common good, or the right action considering the

74
well-being of oneself and others. Green believes that all mentally competent
individuals possess at least a general sense of the common good which can be referred
to as simply acting empathetically toward others; its aggregate progress is measured by
the degree of "civilization" of a society. However, an individual can choose lower
level actions over what one perceives as proper actions. In fact, it talces much more
mental discipline to choose the common good over immediate self-pleasure. This is
where Green puts emphasis on "obligation" within a civil society. He believed it
would be easier for citizens to choose the common good, and voluntarily follow
obligation, if knowledge of the common good's relationship to the individual's good is
7

revealed. To Green this is what is meant by self-realization. The role of the state is to
promote not coerce the common good , and to provide the environment necessary to the
process of self-realization. Since the common good is dynamic in nature, and since it
is to be reflective of all individuals, not a tyranny of minority or majority self-interest,
the state should remain highly democratic and the individual's choice of acceptance of
the good should remain voluntary. This retains the liberal nature of Green's
philosophy which in many ways appears more liberal than the paternal republicanism
of earlier liberal interpretations.. However, Green's foundation and promotion of the
common good broke previous liberal tradition by implying the existence of the positive
state, a state which plays an active role in the education and welfare of the individual to
8

promote greater freedom. This embraces the idea of social liberty where a state can
limit individual liberty in order to provide greater aggregate liberty. It is important to
note here that Green's philosophy would actuaily perceive that an individual liberty that
is in conflict with greater group liberty is not actually a liberty at all. However, Green
perceived that this positive role of the state would be used sparingly, mainly to educate
and protect an educative environment which fosters self-realization.

9
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Green's liberal theory, though not highly descriptive of community, used the
idea of community as the residence of the common good. Similar to liberal theorists
before him, Green tended to merge the ideas of state and community. The idea of the
nation state was the focus of the liberal debate since Lockean times and merely reflects
the reality of its sovereign nature. However, it is important to note Green's views
towards local community. Since the basis of Green's liberalism originated with the
individual and one's self-realization of the good, he stated that all individuals are at
different levels of realiz.ation. Building upon this sense of diversity, Green also held
that different local communities also at different levels of progression and definitions of
the common good. Therefore, the common good arrived at by a small interactive
community has a greater chance of grounding itself with the individuals who shares the
same experiences and environment.

10

This means a greater chance of voluntary

obligation and less coercion than a larger regional authority who must resolve conflicts
among a greater diversity of interests. While the larger state may offer a greater pool of
knowledge to access the good,the smaller community offers more direct cause/effect
logic toward citizenship. Green used Rousseau's defense of the local community as
the logical instrument of the general will and made parallel assumptions concerning the
common good. Green's own personal life reflected a strong commitment to local
citizenship which he claimed to be the logical starting point to understanding the
concept of the common good. He saw the nation state as sovereign in reference to the
basic protections necessary for individual self-realiz.ation. This might be considered to
be just short of a constitutional democracy. However, he would also envision the
protection of the autonomy of local governments in the creation of the good as long as
it did not conflict with the basic assumptions of the state. For to allow the community
freedom of arriving at a common good is one step closer to allowing the individual the
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freedom to arrive at it. Green did not fear this temporary diversity since all evolution
was to arrive at the same point.

II

When assessing Green's relationship of the individual and the collective
authority, one can see an uneasy balance of Mill's individual expression with
Rousseau's general will that relies heavily upon his idealistic metaphysical assumptions
to make it logical. Green envisioned the collective authority to be highly democratic.
This was to allow the common good to remain highly progressive and dynamic so as
not to become mired in an interest-based dogma. To check a tyranny of the majority,
he would limit this authority to a promotion not coercion of the common good. This
would protect individual choice and allow challenges to the flaws of the present
common good to exist. Though limited in its powers of coercion, which seems to
denote a negative state, Green would allow authority to become a tool of the collective
in altering the environment of the state to promote greater individual self-realization. In
other words, Green saw the state as a tool created to accomplish what individuals could
not voluntarily do themselves.

12

Though he justified the positive state, Green was

quick to qualify its use. The state would be used to further increase the individual's
rational decision making, not to make the choice for the individual. For instance, rather
than create laws that provide for a more equitable division of profits for workers, the
state should provide education and reduce the effects of poverty that will allow workers
the tools to demand greater equity of employers.

13

Progress to Green was not measured by technological advancement, but rather
in the advancement of individuals toward knowledge of the pure good. Signs of
progress would be seen in the lessening of self-interest individualism and greater
voluntary actions toward the collective good.

14

Basically, two factors shaped Green's

adoption of his liberal idealism. The first being the fear that the church was no longer
effective in providing moral guidance, and British empiricism, which disabled it,
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offered no moral guidance in its place. This then becomes the motivation of Green's
idealistic foundations: to provide an ethical foundation for liberal society. Secondly,
Green's experience at Oxford came at a time when higher education was becoming
available to individuals of the middle class based on merit which was a break from the
past restrictions which allowed only those of the landed class to enter. Green's peers
were of a new highly educated middle class which distinguished itself not only from
the working class below it and the landed class above it, but also from the capitalist
class of the same level. From this unique new vantage point, the idealists could see the
class interests which fostered individual hedonism and its conflict. The cure was to
provide to all the very elixir which had allowed the idealists to see so clearly education.

15

Hobhouse
Leonard T. Hobhouse signifies the next evolution of the new positive state
liberalism initiated by Green. However, Hobhouse disagreed with the direction
Green's idealist followers had taken, particularly with Bosanquet who had inflated
Green's importance of the state to Hegelian status.

16

Hobhouse was one of the first

"new liberals" to be influenced by the experience of the First World War, a war
Hobhouse blamed on the influences of Hegelian nationalism.

17

This caused

Hob house's liberalism to be not o·nly weary of hedonistic individualism, but also of the
excesses of the collective mindset. What will also mark Hob house's liberalism is that
he becomes the first liberal philosopher to state that the economic system is not natural
and thus is open to state intervention in pursuit of greater liberty for individuals.

In many respects, Hobhouse reaffirms the concepts established by Green. He
first of all agrees that political systems are of social rather than individual origin. This
then lays the foundation, similar to Green, that rights are a creation of society, not
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something with which people are naturally endowed. Since they are created, they are
balanced with obligations, which in essence are the protectors of those rights.
Therefore, a right can never be an action at the expense of another individual, but must
be complimentary to the free action of others. Like Green, Hobhouse states that when
the good of the individual and the good of the community are the same, the common
good is realized. To Hobhouse, the common good was to be the only context of real
liberty. Unlike Mill, Hobhouse did not see a large separation between public and
private liberties. He would be quick to point out that there are very few actions which
do not indirectly affect others.
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This then reinforces the idea of liberty as a social

concept. Finally, .in concert with Green, Hobhouse fosters a positive state which
actively promotes and protects the common good which is defined as the maximization
of individual self-realization. The role of the positive state is to create, even if it limits
the individual action of some, the environment where "real" opportunity exists for all,
not to guarantee outcomes. However, this is were the similarities to Green end and
Hobhouse's specific justifications of liberalism begin.
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More in line with traditional British empiricism, Hobhouse removed the idealist
label from his defense of new liberalism. Idealism tended to lose its appeal as a new
pessimism arose out of the of spectacle of inhumanity witnessed in the First World
War. Not seeking to fathom the depths of Green's metaphysical foundations of the
good or Locke's natural rights, Hobhouse would settle for the foundation that it is
inconceivable to imagine man not existing in a social context. In another important
deviation from Green, Hobhouse viewed the common good not the realization of
similarity of individuals, but the understanding and toleration of differences. The end
result would be unity, not uniformity.
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This is a significant move, for it implies the

idea of the pluralistic nature of society which will become a dominant trait of future
liberal philosophies. To Hobhouse, the common good promoted by the state was to be
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"harmony'', much as Bentham promoted "happiness".

21

Finally, Hobhouse would go

much further than Green in allowing the positive state to regulate the economic system.
He believed that political freedom without economic freedom is not freedom at all.

22

Similarly to Green, Hobhouse did not see the positive state as the dispenser of
charity, but rather the eliminator of barriers to self-realization. However, Hobhouse's
view of the nature of the economic system differed from Green's. He did not see the
economic system as independent of the political system; instead he saw it as a creation
of the political system. Since the economic system is under the jurisdiction of the state,
it becomes the responsibility of the state to assure that it is a "just" system. His rule
was that a liberty used at the expense of another is not a liberty. Hobhouse would
contend that there will be economic differences between individuals assessed on
principles of comparable worth. However, no one shall be under-paid or overpaid
which is is justice. Any excess profits should be returned to state to contribute to
maximizing the equal liberties of all. Hobhouse believed the state should not house,
feed, and clothe the poor, but rather eliminate the environment which causes poverty;
empower the individual. The liberal state should enforce the "right to work" and the
"right to a living wage" just as strongly as the right to property. In essence, the right to
23

run a business is balanced by obligations to others involved.

Though Hobhouse promoted a greater role for national government, it is limited
to the promotion of greater equal liberties. While he is confident that the national state
is the only level with enough power to alter environments to promote liberty, he is
equally fearful of placing other powers in the hands of a central government. He
forewarned the problems of mass society with its bureaucratic alienation. He stressed
that community has similar rights as the individual, and that greater autonomy should
be created at the local levels.

24
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Hobhouse's view ofthe relationship between a collective authority and the
individual seems blurred due to the interdependencies between both. Since he believed
that there existed an organic rather than mechanical relationship between the individual
and the community, liberty was a social concept and focuses on the group rather than
the lone individual. Hobhouse would frame in liberty as legitimate (a) only if it is
equally enjoyed by all, and (b) only ifit is congruent with the good ofthe community.
On the first point dealing with equal enjoyment, Hobhouse was not implying that the
collective enforce equality of outcome. Instead, he is promoting the idea that liberty
cannot be enforced so therefore protection ofthe individual's choice of self- realization
must become a prerequisite to true liberty. However, due to the plurality ofself
interests and the interactive nature ofsociety, liberation of individual choice does not
assume a negative liberty because a liberty ofone may produce a limitation ofchoice on
the part ofthe other. Equal enjoyment ofliberty involves a positive stance from the
collective. Equal enjoyment ofliberty first assumes opportunity ofaction to be real and
not the principled facade it appears to be in modem liberal states. This is to say it stops
becoming an abstract right and becomes a working reality to be enforced by the state.
Here, Hobhouse demands a liberal positive state to be much more manipulative ofthe
environment to ensure real individual choice. Equal enjoyment of liberty also implies
that individual action is "limited" to action which does not reduce the opportunity of
"real" choice of others. Therefore liberty, which is a meaningless term outside of a
social contex, cannot exist without constraints. Government then becomes necessary
to liberty by representing society's enforcement ofconstraints on individual action
25
which in tum creates liberty.
On the second condition of liberty, the good of the community, Hobhouse is
limiting individual action to action which does not endanger the community. It is here
that he claims a right ofa community similar to a right ofan individual. Since the
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community is not only natural but also the safeguard of liberty, its existence is vital to
the individual. Therefore, individual action is limited if it endangers the community.
This would not imply that individual action would be limited by protection of an non
liberal community. This is where Hobhouse sees that the individual as the source of
liberty and the precious focus of his entire theory. However, it could be stated that
illiberal action by the individual does not deserve any greater sympathy than a despotic
collective.
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Since Hobhouse views community as organic, and its composition as pluralistic
and interdependent, the positive state becomes a requirement, not an option. Hobhouse
also adds another dimension which empowers the positive state. This would be the
dynamic nature of the environment and the ensuing question of progress. Hobhouse is
perhaps the first liberal theorist to include into the debate between the individual and the
collective a third variable; the environment. Different than the historic world view
progression of Hegel, Hobhouse focused more on the immediate environment
surrounding individuals. This physical, political, social, and economic enviroment
could not be removed from the equation of individual liberty. This environment was
also dynamic in the sense that individual action upon any of the above areas could
cause a change in the environment which ultimately would impact individual
freedoms.
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This interrelation between the individual and the environment reduced the

objective quality given to the environment in the past. Now the environment was
viewed more subjectively in the sense that it could be either manipulated consciously
for the self interest of some, or that it could be impacted naively in the sense that the
impact of the action is not known. The key of the subjectivity lying in the fact that the
course of progress is not some how predestined, but rather only reflective of casual
choices. This assumption then places greater justification of the community to control
the environment rather than be its passive passenger. This then allows Hobhouse to
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view government as a tool to intercede into social, and economic areas not previously
entertained by liberal theories. However, to combat totalitarian tendencies of this
assumption, it is remembered that collective action upon the environment must only be
used to increase individual liberty as Hobhouse defined it.
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The stronger positive role

of government would seem to create a more subjective role for government concerning
progress. To Hobhouse, progress was not mechanical, but rather spiritual. As
mentioned earlier, it was not to be based on the ability to add pleasure or happiness to
self-indulgences, but rather to increase the aggregate's vision of choice and the
environment which allows the possible realization of the chosen. Progress would be
marked by greater group liberty with less coercion.

29

Barker
Earnest Barker, a noted historian of liberal democratic philosophy, contributed
to liberal thought a strong sensitivity to pluralism and the importance of groups. His
general conditions of liberalism bear striking resemblance to Hobouse's which
definately labels him as a "New Liberal".
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It is Barker's development of certain

procedural aspects of New Liberalism which becomes his legacy to liberal thought.
Two major ideas stand out clearly in his assessment of New Liberalism. The first is
the recognition of the importance of plurality to a liberal society, and the importance of
the autonomy of sub-groups in relation to that pluralism. The second is to cast New
Liberalism as a evolutionary rather than revolutionary or static condition.
On the first point, Barker, like Hobhouse, would concede that the heart of
liberal thought resides in the basic moral assumptions articulated by Kant and J.S. Mill:
Kant's basis of individual equality and Mill's protection of individual expression.
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Also like Hobhouse, Barker would conclude that this Kant/Millian individual would be
endowed with moral freedom, not unlimited freedom.
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Moral freedom presupposes
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obligations or limited behavior, and reality dictates a positive rather than negative state
to protect moral freedom. However, Barker, reflecting on the collective movements of
Nazism and Communism, and Italian fascism began to see the dangers of the positive
state equal those of the negative state.
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Wanting to protect New Liberalism, which he

saw the positive state as the only possibility of greater freedom, he needed to look
inward and find the mechanisms of the positive state which would prevent it from
illiberal totalitarian tendencies. He saw the greatest danger in the Hegelian merger of
state, society, community and individual. However, he also saw that dominant liberal
thought, from Locke to the New Liberals, guilty of ignoring the distinctions between
collective entities. Though the national state is necessary in the sense that it is the only
real collective powerful enough to maintain basic rights in an interactive nation,
centralization promotes bureaucracy which in tum promotes oligarchy. Barker saw the
New Liberal movement as moving dangerously close to the usurping of sub-groups
into the national system. Unless these sub-groups were allowed identity and limited
autonomy, alienation and apathy would erode the checks necessary to maintain an
environment of individual growth.
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Barker contends that there are two types of

collective: the social and the legal. The social groups are ones that are formed naturally
by coincidence and their obligations are more of a voluntary nature. In descending size
and intimacy they would include: national culture, regional culture, local community,
associations, neighborhood, extended family, nuclear family. The legal groups are
ones that are formed more purposely from social groups and in which obligations
become enforceable. These are the institutionalized authorities known as governments.
These entities have seemed to coincide historically with national, regional, and local
level of authority. Barker would maintain that associations can at times overlap into
legal authority. Barker's fear here then is twofold. First is the concern that if
distinctions of social and legal are blurred, the overiding authority of a Platonic or
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Burkean city/state will exist. The fear here is that the legal authority, which is the most
organized of the two, is soon perceived as the social group. This creates the situation
where the legal authority defines the identity ofthe social group, rather than the social
group defining the legal authority. Secondly, compounding the first idea, is Barker's
fear ofliberalism's evolution toward greater national government intrusion into the
affairs of sub-national systems. He sees the individual acceptance ofnational
sovereignty as a far cry from individual sovereignty which was manifested in collective
local authority directly touching their lives. Barker points to modem totalitarian
systems and their perceptions oflocal particularisms as a threat to be a clear warning to
liberal sysytems. In fact, Barker sees the national aside from its vital role ofprotecting
the basic human liberty from infringement from individual, group or environment, as a
force which creates conformity by reducing individual diversity by its majoritarian or
oligarchical tendencies. Therefore, Barker's solution is both horizontal and vertical in
nature. It is horizontal by the necessity to distinguish between social and legal entities,
and to realize that the social system is creator of the legal system. It is vertical by
35
maintaining limited autonomy within the levels ofgovernment.
Building upon his theory of social group primacy, Barker's second major
contribution to liberal theory was his insistence on its evolutionary nature. Though
Barker would disagree with Hegel's nationalist implications, he shared a Hegelian
sense of organic evolution. To Barker, legal authority is prone to act, in regards to the
status quo, either by revolution or by artificially maintaining its status. Society,
however, moves at an incremental and evolutionary pace. Therefore, radical and
reactionary movements are a sign oflegal rather than social control of a liberal system.
Besides the illiberal implications oflegal control, Barker sees direct social problems
associated with revolutionary or reactionary movement. Sounding similar to Burke,
Barker finds revolutionary change uprooting the natural stability of a social system.

85
Traditional institutions should evolve by the gradual pressure of social change, not
proceed ahead of it. However, nor should change be halted. Barker believed existence
to be dynamic, where environment and individuals were constantly changing. To hold
back change would be a sure sign that a particular self-interest would be involved.
Similarly to Hobhouse, Barker perceived government's role to be constantly
monitoring and adjusting to the maximization of aggregate liberty. It would then stand
to reason that continual monitoring of revolutionary change would be a ridiculous
concept. It would also stand that if society is naturally dynamic, to resist change would
stunt the realization of maximum liberties.
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Barker states that the case for a strong system oflocal government is almost
clear beyond discussion. He perceives the main check on the mass society implications
of New Liberalism is the recognition and empowerment of sub-national level groups.
The individual as a voice is definitely lost in the realities of mass democracy. However
empowerment of groups at a more local level creates a check to the smothering aspect ·
of national dominance. As long as groups, legal or social, comply with the basic
rights established by the national government, decisions are much more efficient and
representative if implemented at the local level. The local focus, however, must be
bracketed by the fact that its system is controlled by the social and not the legal group.
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Here, Barker may envision a highly democratic local government limited only in action
by basic human liberty principles established by the national society. Both national and
local governments in their respective roles are empowered to protect not only the
political and religious, but also economic freedom of choice of their members,
remembering that choice entails actions not limiting the "real" choices of others.
Diversity would lie in the "home rule" choices of local groups. The progress of
national society to be judged by monitoring correctly environmental realities, and
adjusting to those realities to further maximize individual growth. The progress of the

local s ociety would be to create the environment, relative to their situation, which
supports their mutual needs while remaining in line with the basic human rights arrived
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at by the national government.
Dewey
John Dewey's influence on liberal construction signals the first time an
American has been used here to define its course. This Atlantic shift parallels the
emergence of the United States as the dominant liberal democratic state during the first
half of the 20th Century. It may also reflect the victorious challenge of American
"pragmatism" to the dominant philosophical schools of Europe. Pragmatism seemed to
put into a word the historic and almost non-ideological creed of American thought.
Dewey, along with Pierce and James, successfully waged attack on Continental
idealism, and Britian's analytical school. Dewey, more than the other two, saw the
opportunity to apply philosophical pragmatism to political and social theory. His
criticism of the idealistic school was that it was too metaphysically dependent. It
tended to cause a smokescreen or painkiller to the real problems faced by societies. Its
insubstantial foundations were susceptible to self-interested interpretation and
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indoctrination. On the other hand, Dewey felt the analytical movement in Britian so
dissected reality as to make it unreal or unintelligible to real actors within a social
system. Dewey's pragmatism seemed to blend the organic/historic nature of idealism
with the scientific experimentation of the empiricist. The force of pragmatism relied
heavily upon assessment of"present" conditions. Its epistemology would be heavily
contextual. Assessment of the present could not exclude the inheritance of the past.
This past gives meaning to the present situation. Dewey would criticize the analytical
empiricist on the same grounds as he would criticize the idealist. He claimed that to
expound on reality on inductive method runs into the same metaphysical abyss as one
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who travels the deductive method. Therefore, heavy reliance on "real" or "ideal"
meanings do not provide the type of knowledge to understand and direct present
situations. To understand society and effectively impact it is to view its components in
their vernacular meaning. History becomes important not in itself, but rather in its
relationship to understanding the present. Progression is constant, and is directed by
reaction to perceptions of present realities. The significance of this philosophical
assessment toward political theory is twofold. First, reactionary or radical movements
within a society are signs of coercive political authority. Reactionary movements
suggest a return to a past condition which denies that any growth has occurred since.
To make this movement feasible, one would have to deny witness to change and
capture a past nievity. This may also include status quo maintenance, since
progression is dynamic; to artificially halt change requires control. Radical movements
which break the continuity of the past would in fact have to wipe away any memory of
the past to be at all feasible realities. Both situations imply an illiberal force necessary
to create this mock reality. Secondly, since progression is natural; a clear assessment
of the present is vital to motivation of actions of society.

40

Informed individuals will

make more intellectual rational decisions which will create the new reality in their favor.
Therefore, awareness (education) of present conditions, which are then scrutinized by
the historically developed moral environment, initiates action which alters that
environment to a new condition and requires a new assessment. If then progression is
natural , an individual is best served with a system that promotes education and
evolution.
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Dewey laments that modem liberalism has become ineffective. It has lost its
original dynamic nature, and has settled on the maintenance of a legal and an economic
framework. It maintains a legal system which offers equal opportunity for selfrealization , while at the same time maintains an economic system whose inequality
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denies that opportunity. In Dewey's estimation, modern liberal states are liberal only
by a historical or ideological label. In reality, they do not actively promote self
realization of individuals, but rather self-preservation of vested interests. As stated
above, absence of growth indicates coercion. Dewey sees the legal system as the force
which maintains the status quo. He also sees individual awareness of present
conditions as both concealed and distorted. Knowledge is concealed in the sense that
no active effort is being made to expose and condemn inequalities that stifle individual
growth. It is distorted in the sense that liberalism is being promoted as a past
y

accomplishment which resists change. Present liberalism appeared reactionar by
preserving centuries old Philosophical Radical Liberalism which had gained a sacred
nature due to its lenghty and protected existence. However, as sovereignty was
transferred to the governmental structure as liberal guardian, the dynamic nature of
liberalism became stifled by the self-interest of those in power.. Dewey blames this
occurrence on the position of liberalism as the out system from Locke to Bentham,
where its nature had to be radical, to its emergence as the system in control after
Bentham. Once in control, liberalism failed to adjust to its new position. Instead of the
environment being able to be manipulated toward greater self-realization of all, as
Philosophical Radicalism had viewed it, the new environment was perceived as an end
to itself and must be preserved. Yet the perception of the individual's relationship to
the system did not change. Even though the new system was liberal and was to be
preserved, the role of the individual was not perceived as acting cooperatively with
others to use it to maintain greater liberty for all. Instead, maintaining the
characteristics of the individual pulling away from an authoritarian rule, the individual's
role was one of autonomy which viewed collective action as a threat. To Dewey, this
stunted liberalism's original intent.
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Dewey claimed that liberalism has a

comprehensive requirement prior to the individual's choice of the good which is the

maximization of self-realization for all individuals. This is based on the reciprocal
relationship that society is created by individuals, and that individuals are created
(identity) by society. Therefore, the roots of liberalism are social. The role of liberal
society is to educate individuals to achieve an accurate sense of present realities, and
cooperatively act to maximize individual liberties. Dewey viewed the state as the
liberator of local associations from past coercive groups to voluntary groups. Dewey
saw the state as not freeing individuals, but rather freeing associations of individuals.
The expression and self-realization of the individual is in a social context. The state's
role is to monitor the environment to best actualize individual self-realization; however,
it is local associations which create the reality, since different groups may experience
different realities.
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Dewey justifies the power of a collective authority over an individual if the
actions of the individual reduced the self-realization of another. He does not see the
state as promoting a common good, besides the maximization of individual liberty.
Communities establish common goods, not the nation state, due to the fact that
communities are voluntary and the state is not.
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Crucial to collective individual action

becomes the role of the society to disseminate information concerning the present
condition and its affects on individuals. Dewey sees the isolation of intelligence to an
individual property as a misconception which has justified inequality of desert as well
as the competitive rather than cooperative use of information. Since knowledge is
cumulative it is not owned by any one individual. Its benefits are deserved by all
members of society.
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Dewey viewed change as a natural and inevitable process. Progress was to be .
marked by a change which increases the self-realization of all individuals. Dewey
makes a strong point to differentiate between scientifidtechnological progress, and
progress which increase liberal self-realization. At times both may be interrelated, and
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at other occasions they may be in conflict. To Dewey, if a society is not changing or
46
aware of changes, it begins to lack its liberal qualities.
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CHAPTER VI
POST-INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISM
The post-industrial time period covers the evolution of liberal thought after the
acceptance of New Liberalism in the post-World War II environment. More
specifically, it describes the period of 1971 to the present. This period is initiated with
the publication of John Rawls' work A Theory of Justice. Rawls' book tended to set
the norm of the new liberal philosophy by which others, critics and allies, judged their
work. It is important to note here that liberalism, in its mainstream form, had been
continuously flanked through the industrial period by criticisms from the left and
right. These critics through their persistance had developed by this post-industrial
period a legitimacy of their own. Both groups of critics, libertarians and neoantifederalists, and democratic socialists, claim to be the true direction of liberal
thought which was perceived to have lost its way. The right is represented by the
reactionary elements within liberal thought which by this point in time have been
labeled Libertarians. This critical voice finds its roots in Locke's natural rights theory
of pre-industrial liberalism, then incorporates the individualism of Philosophical
Radicalism of Bentham and Smith in early liberalism, moves to further justification of
the negative state with Spencer's natural progression theory of the late industrial
period, and finally culminates in the works of Frederick Hayek and Robert Nozick in
the post-industrial period. This voice is highly critical of the incorporation of more
social liberty and positive government from the New Liberal influences into dominant
liberal interpretation. The voices on the left, however, see mainstream liberal belief as
not going far enough toward protecting individuals from the illiberal and unjust affects
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of capitalism. This group claims that a democratic socialist state is the ideal liberal
system and are often called Social Democrats. This group sees its philosophical goals
accomplished in the further progression of New Liberalism. A third group of critics
called the communitarians seem to avoid the convienient reference points of right or
left. They might be referred to at first glance as a populists. They are critical of the
right for its stress on individualism, and critical of the left for its centralization. They
are critical of mainstream liberalism for protecting both ideas. Their philosophical
support tends to come from what might be called the "shadow liberalism" of Rousseau
and the Romantics to Jefferson; also with some, notably Taylor there is a domesticated
Hegelianism.
These critical voices become the parameters of liberal thought in the post
industrial period. It is within these parameters, and due to their force, that John
Rawls crafted his liberal theory. He addresses the concerns of the post-industrial
democratic welfare state. It is a society in which technology has made it possible to
meet the needs of all; yet this same technology appears to have stunted this possibility
by fostering individual competition by its continual creation of new wants. It is a
society in which bureaucratic centralization has created an economic safety net, yet
has dulled the democratic spirit in the process. It is an interdependant society were
self-reliance means one uses others instead of them using you; where basic need
fulfillment shifts from local to national and individualism means self-imposed
alienation rather than self-realization. It is also a society which has long conquered
Nature, yet is now begining to realize its own finite nature.
Due to the fact that this period is in its early stage, John Rawls stands as the
signature representative of liberal thought from 1971 to the present. This chapter will
concentrate on his interpretation of liberalism as he applies the traditional principles of
liberalism to the environment he observes. Though the concentation here is on one

liberal theorist, there are actually two Ralwsian interpretations of liberalism: the first
is his ideas conveyed in A Theory of Justice( 1971), secondly is his evolution based
on criticism from the left and right in Political Liberalism( 1993). While maintaining
the basic principles constructed in a A Theory of Justice, his latter work represents a
significant shift from philosophical foundations to more pragmatic political
2
foundations.
The basic motivation for A Theory of Justice was Rawls' attempt to provide
for a justification for means to realize liberal principles which he claimed distorted in
contemporary society. Rawls maintained as liberal principles the idea of individual
priority (liberty) as established by Locke, the idea of individual equality stressed by
Kant, and the idea of individual self-realization as best articulated by J.S. Mill. He
rejected utilitarian and intuitionist foundations for liberal thought for their distributive
and other negative consequences. In line with Dewey, Rawls reinforced the
p ragmatic direction of liberal thought by refusing to entertain metaphysical notions for
the defense of liberal principles. Instead of focusing on the justification of liberal
principles, Rawls focused his work on the issue of just distribution, a social good
often neglected by liberalism. His main criticism was the application of the concept of
equal opportunity in contemporary liberal states. He viewed the modem interpretation
of this concept as a barrier to further self-realization of the individual and as a lack of
sensitivity to what is truly meant by a free and equal inheritance of individuals. To do
this Rawls establishes "justice" as the highest order good in the procedural application
4
of liberalism.
In order to energize liberal principles, Rawls offers the "difference principle"
as the corrective force for modem liberalism. This principle is based on the assuption
that there had never existed a social contract which individuals entered on a level
playing field with de facto equality of opportunity. The claim here is that historic
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evidence does not support a situation where social position or natural talents among
individuals were considered equal, therefore, individuals would not posess equal
bargaining power when the agreements are struck. This poisons the waters of the
traditional conception of the social contract by assuming distribution of resources to be
the accurate reflection of individual choice. Rawls views inheritance as the reflection
of distribution of resources much more than individual choice. The problem with
unequal distibution of resources is that it prohibits the equal self-realization of
individuals, and if this distribution is not based on choice is its foundation illiberal. In
order to avoid the dilemma of placing liberal goods of liberty and equality in conflict,
Rawls synthesizes these concepts into a concept of justice. This concept would
prioritize distribution accordingly: (a) equal liberty, (b) equal opportunity, and (c)
equal resources. Rawls holds liberty as the traditional priority, yet distances himself
from the liberal Right by stressing positve liberty rather than negative liberty. Since
distribution of resources can affect opportunity for equal liberty, differences of
distribution should not only be deserved but should also not reduce the equality of
b

lierty established in the first priority which is the basis of Rawls's difference
principle. The difference principle also reveals why the equal distribution of resources
would be ranked third. Given the present realities of unequal distribution, Rawls
views attempts by the liberal Left to hold equal or contribution based distribution
above liberty as illiberal in their consequences. Though he would concede that greater
equalization of resources would create greater equal liberties, Rawls views total equal
distribution as not only being unrealistic, but also undesirable. His difference
principle states that, given the present inequalities, future discrepencies of distribution
should be based on the principle that that difference is to the advantage of the least
favored groups within that society. The hope here is that this would create an

evolution from the present state of inequalities towards a greater equal liberty implied
in liberal thought.

6

In order to justify his difference principle, Rawls had to replace the foundation
of the traditional social contract. Rather than discover truths at the metaphysical level,
Rawls preferred to work at the comprehensive level. The comprehensive level
involves the development of general truths based on experience rather than intuition
found at the metaphysical level. It also differs from the political level in that it
suggests universality rather than relativity. Instead of construction of a metaphysical
contract, Rawls constructs a hypothetical contract drawn from the comprehensive
level. This contract, called the "original position" was not meant to detail a prior
metaphysical existence, but rather to serve as a tool in which individuals could
logically conceive the motive of liberal principles based on comprehensive knowledge
and was explicitly addressed to the issue of distribution, not aggregate good. In the
original position, Rawls asks the individual to put themselves in a hypothetical
position behind a veil of ignorance. This "veil of ignorance" would not allow the
individual to be knowledgeable of one's social position or natural talents. In this state
the individual's formation of the contract would not be tainted by competitive forces of
self-interest, but tends to represent a disinterestedness which individuals enter in with
like concerns. The individual behind the veil, while knowledgeable of the social
lottery which could provide for differences and is in possession of certain economic
and social principles, is not aware of hiS!ber fate. This creates a situation where the
individual and the collective merge, where identical situations and unknown
consequences lead to a logical consensus of principles which maximize benefits and
minimize risks of the individual. It is within this hypothetical state that Rawls
concludes that the difference principle would be established by rational risk
minimizers. While Rawls admits that it is not feasible to imagine this situation ever
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existed, nonetheless it is feasible that individuals could logically empathize with it and
8
draw principles from it.
Through an understanding of Rawls' principles it becomes possible to deflect
some of the communitarian charges, especially those aimed at his adherence to the
Lockean model of social contract and the absence of sensitivity of communal
attachments. These charges may be more accurately aimed at critics to the right of
Rawls. Though his negation of the social contract may be obvious, his sensitivity to
communal attachments, especially the collective achievement ofjustice, underlies his
theory. Rawls does not deny his giving priority to the individual which is a dominant
liberal prerequisite. However, his entire theory views communal attachments
necessary in order for the idea of equal liberties to be manifested. His requirements
for liberal societies to have a love of mankind and a natural duty to sacrifice for greater
equality due to finite resources does not appear to represent the self-interested
Rawlsian individual communitarians have developed. The idea of equal liberties
without the coercion of state action could only be possible with a concern of
individuals toward each other.

9

Rawls does not perceive the necessity of communal attachments as an
objective common good to be enforced by the state, but rather sees it as a common aim
realized by the individual with the help of the conception of the original position. He
sees the conception of the good at the metaphysical level as not only unknowable, but
also subject to manipulation which could create totalitarian consequences.

10

The only

knowable good to Rawls would be those principles which provide an overlapping
consensus. This consensus is described as the ideas shared by both private and public
morality and across principal interests. It is within this realm that collective principles
of justice must be entertained. It is the general consensus shared by all of what
comprises leading a good life realizing the finite limitation of resources.

11
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There may be a shift in Rawls's position in the recent Political Liberalism, a
move regretted by some contemporary liberal philosophers of the Left, his seeming
movement of consensus from the comprehensive social to the political level. Though
maintaining the basic principles established in A Theory of Justice, Rawls's shift at
this level threatens his interpretation of those principles established in A Theory of
Justice. Sensitive to the criticism from communitarians and libertarians and
responding to the increasing incoherence of pluralist societies, Rawls opted to
establish a more defensible position. Instead of assuming universality of liberal
conceptions at the comprehensive level, he held that these conceptions of the good
could only be justified given the specific environment in which they were nurtured; to
do otherwise would be to import a subjective good into liberal thought. The
environment was reduced to the unique development of a nation state, and the
consensus was to be reflected in the specific political constitution of that state.

12

This

reflects the modem progression ofliberal thought to remove itself further from
assuming knowledge of universal morality. Stressing the increasing plurality of
modem nation states, Rawls now demands a greater neutrality of the state in assuming
a comprehensive moral consensus. Rather than the state assisting individuals in
comprehending comprehensive principles as implied in A Theory of Justice, Political
Liberalism questions comprehensive principles as socially influenced, and sees the
state's role as providing citizens with the knowledge to understand their own social
influences.

13

This understanding termed "full publicity", reflects a more pragmatic

method of arrival to the original position. While Rawls still articulates the ideas of
liberty and opportunity within this new interpretation, the idea of the difference
principle apparantly becomes subordinated to the constitutional interpretations of a
specific society. Rawls specifies that his principles may only be grounded in
14
American liberalism rather than liberalism in general.
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In both ofhis works, Rawls maintains the dominant liberal concept that
community originates voluntarily. This statement should not be taken to mean that
community is unnecessary, as communitarians have taken it, but rather that
community not be placed above the free expression of individuals. As stated earlier,
Rawls sees community as a means and not an end ofindividual self-realization. His
distinction between public and private spheres ofcommunity would allow private or
non-governmental communities the liberty to pursue conceptions ofthe good as long
as they did not limit the individual protections established by the national constitution.
Public communities, such as local government, must remain neutral due to their
coercive and pluralistic nature. However, it is implied here that this neutrality could
allow specific objective goods relative to that specific environment to exist if they do
not conflict with constitutional protections. This latter concept reflects the idea of
subsidiarity, which can be interpreted in Rawls' shift to the political from the
comprehensive. Therefore, the strict limitations on the local community would be the
pursuit of a subjective good or the pursuit ofan objective good which is in conflict
with constitutional protections. It is here that Rawls holds the national community as
the most desirable entity capable of articulating and protecting individual liberty. The
guardian ofrights becomes the role ofthe national collective; sub-national collectives
must operate within the parameters of national authority when concerning conception
ofthe good. The adminstrative task ofgovernments could provide for a greater role
for local systems based on the idea ofsubsidiarity but confined by constitutional
IS
requirements.
The indications of positive government as expressed by the the idea ofthe
difference principle reveals some insight into how Rawls might perceive the concept
of progress. Though he has not been specific on the conception of neutrality of
progress as technological advancement, he has been specific on the progression
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toward expanded equal liberty. It could be extrapolated from this that Rawls would
consider restrictions on some area of technological advancement if it produced a
disadvantage to the liberty of the least favored group.
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CHAPTERVIl
ASSESSMENT
The past four chapters have seived to expose consistent ideas concerning the
role of community in liberal thought, the objective of this research. This final chapter
t

will analyze these common poins in hopes of formulating a liberal position on the role
of community. It may then be a topic of further research whether this position could
protect the nature of endangered community which was the problem established in the
first two chapters. Reviewing the history of liberal intellectual thought has revealed
two important contributions toward the objective of this project. It has first exposed
consistent liberal principles which seive to identify and stabilize the liberal position.
Secondly, it reveals the dynamic nature of liberalism through the various interpretations
of writers each reflecting the environment and experiences which have surrounded
them. This reinforces the idea of John Dewey in his claim that liberalism can never be
a position which protects the status quo but must always be adapting to the changing
environment. This plurality of interpretation should not however be misrepresented as
plurality of principle; this has remained consistent from Locke to Rawls. The three
major principles of liberal thought which become obvious through historical
exploration are: ( 1) the individual as being prior to collective authority, (2) the equality
of individuals, and (3) the goal of self-realization for individuals.
The idea of the individual as being prior to collective entities relates the idea
that the individual is the highest priority of political decision making. This concept is
based on the assumption that the individual was free prior to creation of political
entities. This position was originally grounded in the reasoning of the Lockean social
104
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contract and individual rights. As advancing science added greater skepticism to
metaphysical ponderings, a more psychological basis was used as the foundation for
the individual as prior. However, it should be noted that this basis only used
psychology as available reasoning, not as a statement of truth. The liberal tradition
since Hume has embraced the idea of skepticism by claiming it impossible to gain
empirical knowledge of total truth. In order to gain foundations of principles within
this skeptical framework liberals allow empirical reasoning to perform the task. This
not only allows liberalism to be dynamic since science pushes empirical evidence, but it
also causes liberalism to be suspicious of intuitionist theories. The contemporary basis
for upholding individual sovereignty would claim that since we do not have evidence of
this prior existence, let the benefit of the doubt rest with the individual. This position
affords the greatest protection of individual choice.
The concept of equality of individuals stresses that the intrinsic worth of all
individuals is the same, that all individuals are born with identical unalienable rights.
This implies the idea that a government observe equal rights of individuals. The
original motivation was Locke's intention to remove the burdens of an imposed caste
system of his time. However, the idea of equality has been a loaded concept for
liberalism. Equality had never intended to mean that individuals are equal in natural
talents, nor that all individuals are of equal worth, so that stations in life should be the
same. Instead, equality meant that government should maintain a situation where
individual free choice determines an individual's position, not legal dictates, signifying
the idea of a level playing field. Kant added another dimension to the concept, by
holding that equality implies a moral concept which would not allow the treatment of an
individual to drop below a certain threshold of dignity. The social implications Kant
added complicated the concept of equality by bringing in the environment as a
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component. Realization that equal opportunity rights did not guarantee equal outcomes
of liberty exposed to the New Liberal movement a view of the environment as a not-so
level playing field. The concern of legal rights as not providing equal opportunity has
provided the qualification of desert when addressing inequalities of outcome. This has
led to the articulation of liberal equality, as stated by Rawls, as the maximization of
equal liberty of individuals where the desert of inequalities are justified by their
5
contribution to further equal liberty by raising staus of the least well-off.. The
reasoning behind this conception of equality is driven by the third and final principle
developed here - individual self-realization.
The idea of self-realization conveys the concept that the individuals should be
"free" to follow their own conception of the good. Since the individual is prior to any
conceptions of the good and since all individuals have equal right to claim the good,
then the good should originate with the individual and the liberal state has the duty to
maintain the circumstances to pursue it. John Stuart Mill best articulates this concept in
his defense of self-expression and protection of the deviant within liberal systems.
This concept does not entertain absolute individual freedom, for if equal self-realization
is to be possible, conflicts of freedom in a social context must be regulated. The
intention is that this regulation is minimal and applied equally. This concept was
further advanced by T.H. Green, who brought about the awareness that self-realization
can be stunted by lack of knowledge an individual may have concerning perception of
self and environment.

This causes a situation where free will is subjugated to

manipulation by socialization or knowledge of choices. This advancement has placed
liberalism into a position of viewing the liberal state in the positive role as educator for
greater self-realization. These three liberal principles then become requirements for any
conception of community role.
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The first inquiry into the role of community in liberal thought was to search for
references of the community as an entity. The dominant expression of community is
that it is a voluntary union of individuals for mutual economic and social self-interest.
Liberals hold that while it is logical that community may have preceded the
development of the legal system (government), it cannot assumed to be prior to the
individual. The first liberal principle will always place community as subordinate to the
individual. Besides the specific development by Rousseau and Jefferson of the
advantages of local community, liberals have tended to treat community as a
unspecified concept.

The idea of subsidiarity may best reflect the idea of necessity of

local systems within liberal states. This idea, which states that local problems are best
handled by local solutions, places the individual in closer control of their own
environment. However the idea of subsidiarity cannot be mistaken for devolution.
Liberalism has increasingly relied on national government to advance ideas of liberty
and equality which local systems have proved incapable of providing. The only other
dominant role of local systems in which Green, Dewey, and the Pluralists have stated
is that they become educational tools in which individuals learn hands-on lessons of
participation and obligation. As an entity, liberals have generally concluded that
community holds no authority other than its contractually made obligations to its
voluntary members. Community is generally described as the socio-economic bonding
of individuals outside of the legaf requirements of the political system and suggests
multiple sites of community.
On the second inquiry, which is the limits of collective authority, liberals will
grant collectives authority but authority limited to the desires of the citizens and
constraints of liberal principles. The idea of government by consent denies the
collective authority power of its own. It is also worth mentioning here that the idea of
democracy and that of liberalism are not necessarily compatible.

10

The fear of a
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situation of tyranny of the majority would place liberal principles above the democratic
powers of collectives, as expressed in the power of judicial review. This is not to
imply that collectives are subject to a deviant's veto, but rather that the collective cannot
intrude upon established liberal principles. There are contractual obligations which
individuals joining collectives must be willing to abide by democratic decisions.
However, these obligations serve administrative roles in order to provide for a
functioning system. The pursuit of the good is left to the individual, not the collective.
Individual choice is the glue of moral oneness, not political coercion.
The last inquiry asks how liberalism perceives progress. The significance of
this statement is that if the community endangered is the traditional direct interactions of
local groups and if certain changes in the socio-economic environment are seen as
detrimental to community, then if a liberal system considers these changes natural, it
must remain neutral. However, if there is a view that changes could be good or bad ,
then could a liberal system actively protect "community" as an advantage to a liberal
system? The development of liberalism through the stages of industrializ.ation and the
change from Philosophical Radicalism to New Liberalism reflects a changing view on
this concept. Early liberalism viewed progress as inevitable and good - a reflection of
unleashed human potential and a force to ease the hardships of life.. After the
experience of the consequences of the industrial revolution, liberal thought perceived
that not all technological advancements had positive effects on individual liberty. The
dominant position was for the state to remain neutral since these advancements reflected
individual expression within an open market economy. The evolution of this position,
however, was toward government involvement as regulator since individual expression
through technological means could alter the liberty of others. However, due to the
principle of self-realization, this positive role of government has concentrated more on
informing individuals of potential harm rather than serving to remove the harm for
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individuals. Therefore, if a local community is being eroded by technological
advancements, the liberal collective has a duty to inform those citizens of the potential
danger but not necessarily the authority to halt those changes. This reinforces that the
individual is the site for conception of the good, not the collective. The collective is
allowed to help provide the tools for individuals to make informed decisions but the
individual must make these decisions.

In conclusion, liberal thought holds that community in its broadest sense as
national community is simply a term to define the collective association of individuals
related by their identity to the nation state. There is no substantial proof that there has
been significant erosion to this largest aspect of commmunity. As a national
community is the United States significantly more pluralistic than during its great
immigration period, or is there less unity towards national identity today than during
the Civil War period? In fact, the socio-economic interdependencies within the national
community are perhaps more active now than at any time in the past. The
interrelationships of its members have always been indirect and its composition
pluralistic, yet increased mobility, interdependencies, and communication have
increased the interrelationships of the national community. This is the site of
community in which liberal systems have placed their greatest priority. The focus of
liberal writers has been the relationship of national community to the individual and the
state. Since the liberal state must secure the equal liberties of "all" individuals in which
laws must be applied uniformly, the authority of sub-systems must be curtailed. The
national community (nation state) is not the community communitarians claim is in
danger; in fact they see the demands of this community as smothering the unique
environments of internal ones. Liberals would reserve the site of community the
authority to control administrative functions which directly relate to that environment
but which do not conflict with administrative functions of the larger community.

110
The focus of this research had been initiated by communitarians who had
deposited the problem of deteriorating traditional bonds of community on the doorstep
of liberalism. Since communitarian claims were found to misrepresent liberalism, this
thesis embarked on a search for the liberal position on the role of community. The
t

research has revealed that, according to liberals, there is little auhority that sub-national
systems possess to protect themselves as an entity. Though liberal thought has
maintained that these communities are necessary, it has delegated higher levels of
priority to the individual and the national community. To answer the question of
whether this is enough residual authority to protect traditional communal bonds from
the corrosive forces of change is a complex question that would require an equally
complex answer. Communitarians have advanced the idea that erosion of the
community in question is due to a breakdown of moral oneness and to strengthen
community requires greater protection of the moral authority of sub-national
communities. It has been shown that a liberal system cannot allow communities greater
moral authority; however, communitarians may also be in error in assessing the loss of
moral authority as cause of community breakdown. If instead community erosion is
due to loss of economic autonomy of the unit, could liberal systems allow greater
economic self-sufficiency of community without compromising the principles and
security of the larger liberal system? In order for a liberal system to become positively
involved in the maintenance of an environment which would preserve traditional
communal bonds, these bonds would have to be proven as valuable to the realization of
liberal principles.
Perhaps the strongest liberal defense of community lies in the motivation that
underlies liberal principles themselves. To locate this motivation one may ask what
inspired liberals such as Locke, Mill, and Rawls to defend the autonomy, equality, and
u

self-realization of individ als? What seems to be revealed is a sincere concern for the
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well-being of "all" individuals. Their concern is not for freedom to act regardless of
consequences, nor the happiness of immediate self-satisfaction at the expense of
others. Instead their motivation seems to reveal a love for mankind, an equal concern
for the precious status of each individual, and a faith that full self-realiz.ation will
provide the knowledge to ground this love and concern within all individuals. These
underlying moral premises of Locke, Mill and Rawls would definately require a healthy
communal framework. In this respect liberals would find community a necessary
element toward the fulfillment of liberal principles. However, liberals would shy away
from further description of community other than the voluntary bonds of invividuals
formed by their mutual needs. Further description of community would begin to
establish a subjective good or a specific view of the community to be required for
individual membership which could not be promoted by a liberal state. Therefore, a
liberal state cannot act paternally to create or define community, its role is to provide the
information and environment for individuals to join and maintain communities of their
choice.
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